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The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction:
A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism
D. Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya

Abstract
Recent Supreme Court decisions confirm for the first time in over six
decades that federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause truly is
limited. These decisions coincide with an increasing appreciation among scholars
and jurists for the concept of competitive federalism. This paper derives the
implications of competitive federalism for the evolution of federal jurisdiction
over trade restraints under the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890). It provides a clear
and substantively reasoned jurisdictional test based on the analysis of geographic
market power familiar to antitrust scholars, practitioners, and regulators in
evaluating horizontal mergers. To be subject to federal antitrust jurisdiction under
this test, Sherman Act defendants must control a sufficiently large share of the
geographic antitrust market that their trade restraint could plausibly affect prices
“in more states than one.”
This test resolves a number of troubling
inconsistencies in the case law on federal antitrust jurisdiction and provides a
useful roadmap for how the Court can constructively realign its approach to
general Commerce Clause jurisdiction. As the Court’s economic understanding
of the market failure underlying a regulatory statute advances, general Commerce
Clause jurisdiction should evolve to require a closer substantive nexus between
the market failure and the effect on interstate commerce necessary to justify
federal jurisdiction This approach will allow the Court to iterate toward an
appropriate and workable balance of dual sovereignty that takes seriously the
concept of competitive federalism without requiring a dramatic departure from
existing constitutional precedent.
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The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction:
A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism
D. Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya
“Choose your rut carefully; you’ll be in it for a long time.”1

INTRODUCTION

Scholars and jurists increasingly acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law on
Commerce Clause jurisdiction desperately needs a new direction. Even Lawrence Tribe, widely
regarded as a liberal commentator, concedes that until very recently the Court’s decisions in this
area came dangerously close to foreclosing it from imposing any kind of principled
constitutional limitation on the scope of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.2 And Chief Justice
Rehnquist has openly admitted that much of the case law is less than a model of clarity.3 In what
has been heralded by some as the Rehnquist Court’s “celebrated project to restore federalism,”4
and by others less prosaically as “the new federalism,”5 recent Supreme Court cases have
imposed Tenth Amendment constraints on federal commerce power,6 limited the local
application of federal regulatory statutes to Congress’s unmistakable intent,7 and most
importantly found that local non-economic activities lie outside the constitutional scope of
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.8 Yet, in spite of indications the Rehnquist Court is inclined to
seek a new direction, it remains to be seen how it might do so in a way that minimizes
troublesome conflicts with the existing body of constitutional precedent. This essay shows that
the Court can look to the evolution of Sherman Act (1890) jurisdiction to realign its approach to
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South Dakota farm-road sign.
Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (2000).
3
U.S. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
4
Michael Greve, Collision Court, Legal Times, June 12, 2000.
5
See, generally, Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and
the Proposed New Abdication, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 869 (2000).
6
E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
7
E.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
8
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2
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Commerce Clause jurisdiction to restore the balance of dual sovereignty while posing little
immediate threat to constitutional precedent.
The first of two steps is for the Court to fully embrace competitive federalism as the longrun framework within which to gradually narrow the evolving contours of Commerce Clause
jurisdiction.9 Competitive federalism has experienced growing appreciation among political
scientists, economists, and constitutional scholars,10 with some even suggesting it has been the
driving force of sustained economic development in modern times.11 There is no doubt the U.S.
Constitution establishes a federal system, but this says nothing about what determines the proper
balance of dual sovereignty.

Under competitive federalism, state and federal governments

compete with one another to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry. State regulation under
local “police powers” is justified when economic markets fail to allocate resources efficiently
due to economic spillovers — so-called “externalities” — that separate the parties who benefit
from those who bear costs of an activity. When confined to a single state, competition from
other states ensures that state’s regulators have sufficient incentive to address economic
spillovers .

In the face of interstate spillovers, however, individual states will misallocate

political resources by engaging in too little regulation of their internal economic markets.
9

Competitive federalism is also variously known as “the economic of federalism,” see Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 23 (1983), and “market-preserving” federalism, see
Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
10
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure theory of Local Expenditures, 60 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); James M. Buchanan &
Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25
(1972); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities,
in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Ralph K. Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protections, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977); Carol M. Rose,
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983);
Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 23 (1983); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 225 (1985); Roberta
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Wallace E. Oates &
Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35
J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Thomas R. Dye, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS
(1990); Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid, COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1991); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1210 (1992); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism
and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate
Charters, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN STATES BE TRUSTED? (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds. 1997), at
129; Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and the
Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 869 (2000).
11
Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
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Federal regulation of economic markets under the Commerce Clause is justified only when
competition between states leads to a political market failure.
This approach has been criticized as a prescription for how the Court should determine
the limits of federal commerce power because those seeking regulation can always make a
plausible claim that the activity in question generates an interstate economic spillover, while in
fact they are motivated by private rent seeking.12 Throughout this essay we remain agnostic on
this issue. Whether a federal regulation is driven by public interest or rent seeking, our sole
concern is with how the Court can gradually identify and screen out applications of the
regulation that do not plausibly involve interstate economic spillovers. The Court can thereby
iterate toward the proper balance of dual sovereignty, and political competition should
increasingly limit the sum of economic rents the respective sovereigns are able to extract.13
Competitive federalism has clear implications for the evolution of Sherman Act
jurisdiction, and this evolution provides a useful roadmap to help the Court can find the
appropriate jurisdictional balance for its general Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It is both
fitting and instructive that case law under one of the nation’s first pieces of Commerce Clause
legislation would provide such a roadmap,14 for this is where judicial understanding of the
relevant market failure can be expected to have evolved furthest to reduce legal uncertainty
raised by the statutory shock. Passed in response to fears that the great trusts were beyond the
power of any state to effectively regulate owing to a political market failure,15 the Sherman Act
prohibits only restraints of trade or commerce “among the several states.”16 For more than 80
years following passage of the Act, the Court struggled with legal uncertainty to identify the
nature of the market failure resulting from various business practices alleged to restrain trade.
12
Nelson Lund, Historical Perspective: Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1045 (1997) (The Court
should abandon “the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, as well as substantive due process and some of
the wilder extensions of equal protection analysis” and can plausibly do so within the bounds of the drafters’ intent
and established constitutional precedent.).
13
For one among thousands of scholarly works on rent seeking, see Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). We discuss the issue of rent
seeking more fully infra, at ?.
14
The first piece of federal Commerce Clause regulation was the Interstate Commerce Act (1887).
15
E.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 658, 658-60, 689-91 (1993) and nn. 9 & 147; and Easterbrook, at 41 n. 40.
16
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, reads as follows: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is hereby
declared to be illegal . . .” Section 2 of the Act reads as follows: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . .”.
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This led to a patchwork of conflicting decisions, judicial confusion over the proper objective of
the Act, and condemnation of business activities now widely recognized as pro-competitive. As
economic theory progressed it gave the Court increasing insight into the nature and effect of
various trade restraints. Driven largely by the Chicago School of economics,17 antitrust scholars
began to develop and test hypotheses regarding a host of business practices that were argued to
restrain trade.18 This process eventually generated a body of scientific knowledge sufficiently
reliable to support expert testimony on the nature of the market failure associated with trade
restraints,19 now widely regarded as the defendants’ exercise of market power. The problem
with market power is not that it allows firms to suppress competition or earn monopoly profits,
but that it may lead them to misallocate resources by reducing output and raising prices to
consumers. Courts and commentators now largely agree the exclusive substantive objective of
the Sherman Act is to promote consumer welfare.20
Case law under the Sherman Act has since evolved toward a body of clear, workable
substantive rules, but relying uncritically on the substantial effects test from its decisions on
general Commerce Clause jurisdiction the Court has routinely upheld applications of the
Sherman Act to restraints that harm consumers only locally, if at all. The Court’s most recent
jurisdictional decision under the Act indicates it has yet to recognize the consumer welfare
standard’s profound jurisdictional implications. In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (1991) a
narrow majority of the Court found an alleged conspiracy by a chain of hospitals to exclude a
single doctor from the Los Angeles market for eye surgery had a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce to support jurisdiction under the Act. But-for the defendants’ aggregated commercial
activities, the Court reasoned, interstate commerce would surely have suffered a substantial

17

Some have criticized the Chicago School as ideologically motivated. Whether true or not, this criticism is largely
irrelevant because the Chicago School focused on scientific hypothesis testing. The spirit of this approach can be
found in Milton Friedman’s pioneering essay The Methodology of Positive Economics (in Essays in Positive
Economics 3 (1953)).
18
This literature is too large to reference in full. Perhaps the first contributor was John McGee, who suggested in an
early article that predatory pricing is irrational and that according to the trial record of U.S. v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S.
1, 69 (1911), the Standard Oil Company never actually used it. John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958);
19
D. Bruce Johnsen, Daubert, The Scientific Method, and Economic Expert Testimony, 9 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY 149 (1999) (addressing the admissibility of economic expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
20
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) and Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 55
(1978).
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effect.21 Joined in dissent by three members of the Court, Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s
“analysis tells us nothing about the substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated
by the particular conduct at issue here.”22 He went on to argue that the Sherman Act “does not . .
. prohibit all conspiracies that have sufficient constitutional ‘nexus’ to interstate commerce to be
regulated. It prohibits only those conspiracies that are ‘in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States.’ This language commands a judicial inquiry into the nature and potential
effect of each particular restraint.”23
Following Summit, federal courts have regularly entertained cases in which the interstate
exercise of market power is so unlikely that the defendants’ restraint should be presumed as a
matter of law to be purely intrastate.24 In the spirit of Justice Scalia’s dissent, the second step the
Court should take to realign its approach to Commerce Clause jurisdiction is to overturn Summit
by formally recognizing the jurisdictional implications of the consumer welfare standard. If the
market failure justifying federal regulation of trade restraints is the exercise of market power,
and if the problem with market power is that it injures consumers by raising prices, then
according to competitive federalism trade restraints that do not plausibly increase prices to
consumers outside the home state should lie beyond federal reach.
Summit’s expansive test for federal antitrust jurisdiction stands in contrast to the Court’s
more recent decisions addressing general Commerce Clause jurisdiction, which, though
themselves supported by only narrow majorities, reflect the Court’s growing appreciation for
competitive federalism. In U.S. v. Alfonso Lopez (1995),28 for example, the Court struck down
the federal Gun Free School Zones Act (1990) as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause
jurisdiction because the criminal activity it addressed was neither commercial nor economic in
nature and therefore could not possibly have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In
21

500 U.S. 322 (1991).
Summit, 336.
23
Summit, 334, 338.
24
Perhaps in an effort to highlight the absurdity of the majority’s holding in Summit, Judge Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in reviewing a post-Summit challenge to Sherman Act
jurisdiction that if two children operating competing lemonade stands agreed to fix prices there is no clear principle
preventing them from being subject to the jurisdiction of the Act, even though “the effect on the national economy
would be slight.” Hammes v. AAMCO, 33 F.3d 774, 780-81 (1994).
25
D. Bruce Johnsen and Moin A. Yahya, A Geographic Market Power Test For Sherman Act Jurisdiction
(forthcoming, American Enterprise Institute).
26
This was Justice Marshall’s interpretation of “among” the several states in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
27
1991 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Justice Department Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, § 1.1 (Sep. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
22
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U.S. v. Antonio J. Morrison (2000) the Court more recently struck down the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (1994), again because the criminal activity it
addressed was neither commercial nor economic in nature. To find otherwise, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted in both majority opinions, would convert the Commerce Clause into a general
police power constitutionally reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. The Court’s
obvious appreciation for competitive federalism in Lopez and Morrison suggests that it may be
inclined to continue in this direction in future cases.
The remainder of this essay builds the normative case in favor of competitive federalism
and shows how its implications for Sherman Act jurisdiction can be used to guide the evolution
of general Commerce Clause jurisdiction. Section I reviews the relevant case law. It begins with
a brief look at a selection of noted cases on general Commerce Clause jurisdiction and then turns
specifically to the case law on Sherman Act jurisdiction. Our intent in reviewing this body of
law is merely to lay a foundation to show that the geographic market power test is broadly
consistent with Commerce Clause case law as it has evolved over the past 180 years.
Section II describes the simple economics of market power and illustrates the practical
approach antitrust regulators have developed under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines to
define the relevant product and geographic markets. This approach identifies the geographic
antitrust market to assess the likely effect of horizontal mergers on market power and consumer
welfare, but we show it can easily be adapted to assess the interstate effects of any category of
trade restraints.
Section III describes what we characterize as the geographic market power test for
Sherman Act jurisdiction.29 According to this test, to establish federal jurisdiction under the Act
the complainant must allege, and ultimately prove, that the defendant has a sufficiently large
share of the geographic antitrust market that it can plausibly exercise market power “in more
states than one.”30 Although straight forward, this jurisdictional test is novel, substantively
reasoned, and completely consistent with the methodology antitrust regulators use under the
Merger Guidelines to evaluate the substantive merits of horizontal mergers.31 The geographic
28

514 U.S. 549.
D. Bruce Johnsen and Moin A. Yahya, A Geographic Market Power Test For Sherman Act Jurisdiction
(forthcoming, American Enterprise Institute).
30
This was Justice Marshall’s interpretation of “among” the several states in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
31
1991 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Justice Department Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, § 1.1 (Sep. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
29
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market power test resolves a number of troubling inconsistencies in the Court’s case law on
federal antitrust jurisdiction.
Section IV demonstrates the analytical force of the geographic market power test. We
show that it is consistent with the statutory intent behind the Sherman Act, and that within the
framework of competitive federalism it is the only economically sensible approach to setting
appropriate limits on federal antitrust jurisdiction. What is more, the geographic market power
test will resolve the current turmoil over Sherman Act jurisdiction in the federal circuits and
hasten the rate at which the Court’s understanding of novel business practices evolves.
Section V concludes by sketching a model of how case law evolves in response to the
judicial uncertainty created by statutory shocks. We show that the geographic market power test
is a compelling step in the evolution of Sherman Act jurisdiction and that it provides the Court
with a useful roadmap to realign its approach to general Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The
legal uncertainty that attends most regulatory statutes prevents the Court from acting too quickly,
but as the Court gradually accumulates the stock of knowledge necessary to identify the
geographic scope of the underlying market failure, it can and should require an increasingly clear
nexus between the proscribed conduct and an interstate spillover. This will allow the Court to
achieve a balance of dual sovereignty consistent with competitive federalism while posing little
immediate threat to constitutional precedent.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICTION
“. . . admittedly, our case law [on ‘substantial effects’] has not been clear.”32

Every first-year law student learns that the federal government derives its sovereign
authority from a limited set of powers enumerated in the constitution. Although the Supremacy
Clause ensures that these powers are plenary,33 and the Necessary and Proper Clause ensures that
they include the power to do whatever is necessary to effectuate them,34 any power not
specifically conferred on the federal government by the constitution is expressly reserved to the
32

Lopez, 559 (Rehnquist, C.J).
U.S. Constitution, Article VI.
34
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
33

9

sovereign states, or to the people, by the Tenth Amendment.35 These residual powers include the
states’ local “police powers.” Various enumerated federal powers have proven to be elastic, but
perhaps none more so than the Commerce Clause, whose jurisprudence prescribes the delicate
balance of dual sovereignty characteristic of our federal system. This section briefly reviews the
Supreme Court’s case law on federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction in four parts.
Part A examines the early era, beginning with Justice Marshall’s famous opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).36

The ensuing case law during this era focused largely on the

resolution of conflicts between state laws that discriminated against interstate commerce and
unexercised federal commerce power — the so-called “negative,” or “dormant,” Commerce
Clause.

By the end of the era it tended toward a narrow and formalistic reading of the

Commerce Clause. Part B examines the transitional era beginning with passage of the Sherman
Act, marking the rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause. During this time the Court gradually
broadened federal authority over interstate commerce, ultimately rejecting, distinguishing, or
simply ignoring many of its early decisions.37 The transitional era witnessed a stunning increase
in the number of federal statutes and culminated in the wake of the New Deal with the Court’s
famous decision in Wickard v. Filburn (1942).38

Wickard dramatically broadened federal

commerce power by extending it to purely local activity that, when aggregated horizontally
across all those covered by the regulation, exerts a “substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.”39 Part C examines the modern era, focusing largely on federal antitrust jurisdiction
under Wickard’s aggregated substantial effects test up through the Court’s decision in Summit.40
This era has been marked by a virtual proliferation of federal statutes tied to the Commerce
Clause, many of them having little to do with obviously commercial activity. In upholding these
statues, the Court continued to expand general federal commerce power under the aggregated
substantial effects test, leading to realistic concerns that federal authority had completely
swallowed the local police powers of the several states.41 Part D examines the Court’s case law
35

The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
36
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
37
Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§
4.6, 4.7, 4.8 (1999).
38
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
39
Wickard, 125.
40
500 U.S. 322 (1991).
41
E.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L. REV. 199, 259
(1971); Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816; Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the
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following Summit, which appears to embrace the framework of competitive federalism and may
signal a post-modern era destined to impose real constraints on federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction.

A. The Early Era

In Gibbons v. Ogden the Court struck down a New York law granting a monopoly to
Robert Fulton over the transport of passengers by steamboat between New Jersey and New York
because it directly conflicted with a federal statute regulating the “coasting trade.” In prescribing
the limits of federal authority over interstate commerce, Marshall found that “[c]ommerce among
the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior.”42 He went on to elaborate in the following famous passage, which the Court has
interpreted at various times to support both narrow and broad federal commerce powers:

Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be restricted
to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . The enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something . . . must be the
exclusively internal commerce of a State[, which does] not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some
of the general powers of the government.43
This statement draws an illusive distinction between state authority over completely
internal commerce — which is reserved to the states — and federal authority over internal
commerce that affects other states — which is the proper subject of federal regulation. In
practice, the distinction has proven difficult to apply with any kind of precision because Marshall
declined to provide a functional blueprint for identifying the nature of the “effects” necessary to
resolve the balance of dual sovereignty. As we show later, the simple economics of market
power provides such a blueprint in the field of antitrust that might usefully be generalized to
other fields.

New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 869
(2000), n. 157.
42
Gibbons,194.
43
Gibbons, 194-95.
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In Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851), the petitioner challenged an 1803 Pennsylvania
statute requiring vessels sailing in or out of the port of Philadelphia to employ a local pilot to
navigate the Delaware River. 44 After Cooley refused the services of a pilot for his vessels, the
Philadelphia Board of Wardens assessed him one-half the normal pilotage fee required by the
statute. Being licensed under the federal statute to carry on the coasting trade, Cooley demurred,
claiming the Pennsylvania statute was invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. According
to Justice Curtis, whether unexercised federal commerce power over a particular subject is
exclusive depends crucially on the nature of the subject. “[T]he power to regulate commerce
embraces a vast field, containing . . . exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature;
some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule . . . and some, like the subject now in
question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of
navigation.”45 In his view, “the nature of [pilotage] is such as to leave no doubt of the superior
fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of different systems of regulation, drawn
from local knowledge and experience, and conformed to local wants.”46 Justice Curtis thus made
an early assertion of competitive federalism as the proper framework for identifying the nature of
the effects necessary to resolve the balance of dual sovereignty.
The ensuing case law, much of it addressing dormant commerce powers, led the Court to
a narrower and more formalistic view of federal commerce jurisdiction, while at the same time
developing the concept of exclusive “state police powers” under the Tenth Amendment.47 The
Court’s increasing formalism gradually gave weight to the now discarded notion —
characterized as “dual federalism” — that state and federal powers repose in separate geographic
“spheres of sovereignty.”48 Most notably, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois
(1886),49 the Court found that a state statute prohibiting discrimination in railroad rates “for any
distance within the State” would not have conflicted with the federal commerce power if its
application had been confined to shipments occurring completely within the state. The Court

44

53 U.S. 299 (1851).
Cooley, 319.
46
Cooley, 319.
47
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1950).
48
Gavil, n. 90, and Bruce Little, Note: A Case of Judicial Backsliding: Artificial Restraints on the Commerce
Power Reach of the Sherman Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, n. 20 and surrounding text (interstate commerce seen to
involve the flow of goods across state lines).
49
118 U.S. 557 (1886).
45
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struck down the statute in the case at hand, however, because it prohibited discrimination against
shipments originating in Illinois but bound for other states.
Perhaps the Court’s most formalistic statement of dual sovereignty came in Kidd v.
Pearson (1888).50 In upholding a state statute allowing the importation and sale of intoxicating
liquors within the state but prohibiting in-state manufacture, even for export, the Court stated that
“[i]f it be held that [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended
to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would
[include] every branch of human industry. . . . It would follow as an inevitable result that the
duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform, and vital interests
— interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the details of their successful
management.”51 Such a scheme, the Court insisted, would be impracticable.

B. The Transitional Era

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895) was the first case to address the extent of federal antitrust
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause,52 and it proved to be a false start. The restraint in
question was a proposed horizontal combination between five sugar manufacturers that would
have allowed its largest member, the American Sugar Refining Company, to control roughly
98% of domestic sugar refining capacity.

Relying heavily on Kidd’s statement of dual

federalism, the Court conceded that the combination would establish a “monopoly in
manufacture,” but found that it was nonetheless beyond the federal power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. In the Court’s reasoning, “the power to control the manufacture of a given
thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition . . . and although the exercise of
that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and
affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part
of it.”53

50

128 U.S. 1 (1888).
Kidd, 20-21.
52
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
53
Knight, 12.
51
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E.C. Knight’s formalistic approach began to unravel only six years later in Swift & Co. v.
U.S. (1905),54 where the Court struck down a collusive agreement between the dealers of sixty
percent of the fresh meat in the country. Although their agreement to reduce the prices at which
they bought livestock and raise the prices at which they sold fresh meat at wholesale applied to
transactions strictly within single states, the Court had little trouble finding the agreement well
within the reach of federal commerce power. Justice Holmes summarily dismissed E.C. Knight’s
formalistic view of federal commerce power in favor of a more functional approach, concluding
that “commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn
from the course of business.”55 The Court layto res t any doubt about the status of E.C. Knight in
its landmark decision in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S. (1911), where it expressly
rejected as “unsound” the formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacture.56 Its case
law thereafter began to embrace the more functional approach Holmes shaped in Swift.
In the Shreveport Rate Cases (1914),57 the Court upheld an Interstate Commerce
Commission order aimed at preventing discriminatory railroad rates by equalizing rates between
Louisiana and Texas with those between equally-distant points entirely within the state of Texas.
Undermining its earlier decision in Wabash, the Court found that the economic effects of purely
intrastate activities of various rail carriers were so closely and substantially related to their
interstate activities that Congress has the power to “prevent the common instrumentalities of
interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to
the injury of interstate commerce”58 as long as federal control of intrastate rates is “essential or
appropriate to the security of that traffic [and] the efficiency of the interstate service.”59
Roughly 15 years later, Franklin Roosevelt’s unprecedented New Deal legislation
ushered in a host of conflicts between state police powers and the affirmative Commerce Clause.
Initially, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935)60 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.
(1936),61 the Court retreated to the distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce it
had relied on in E.C. Knight. Striking down the wages and hours provisions of the National
54
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Industrial Recovery Act (1933), the Court in Schechter found that persons employed in purely
intrastate activities have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce and therefore fall outside
the reach of federal commerce power. Roosevelt’s Court Packing Plan quickly put an end to this
retreat.62 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) the Court addressed a challenge to the
National Labor Relations Act (1935), which prohibited employers from engaging in various
“unfair labor practices affecting commerce.”63 Although purporting to preserve the distinction
between commerce among the several states and commerce completely internal to states,64 Chief
Justice Hughes abandoned Schechter’s direct-indirect effects distinction. Instead, he found that
the reach of the federal commerce power is necessarily a question of degree, extending to
intrastate activities having “such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”65
Five years later, in Wickard v. Filburn (1942),66 the Court cemented NLRB’s “close and
substantial relation” approach, finally putting to rest the formalistic distinctions it relied on in
Wabash, Kidd, E.C. Knight, and Schechter and expanding federal commerce power to what may
be “the outer limits” of the constitutional authority.67 There, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(1938) imposed a national quota on the “marketing” of wheat, and the Secretary of Agriculture’s
marketing orders in turn allotted the national quota to individual farms, including Filburn’s.
When Filburn produced what the Court conceded was a “trivial” amount of wheat in excess of
his allotment purely for use and consumption on the farm, the Secretary assessed him a
marketing penalty.68 Filburn claimed the marketing quotas were beyond the reach of federal
commerce jurisdiction because they applied to strictly local production and consumption whose
effects on interstate commerce, if any, were merely “indirect.”69 The Court flatly rejected
61
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Filburn’s claim. Noting that that Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons “described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded,”70 Justice Jackson found that Congress can
regulate even local production for farm use that is trivial by itself if, aggregated horizontally
across many local producers, “it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” by
displacing market transactions that would otherwise occur.71

We characterize this as the

cumulative or aggregated “substantial effects” test for federal commerce jurisdiction.

C. The Modern Era

Three years after its expansive decision in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court decided
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. (1948),72 specifically relying on
Wickard’s horizontal aggregation principle to establish Sherman Act jurisdiction over an
agreement among local sugar beet refiners. The complaint alleged that the defendant, one of
three refiners located in northern California, conspired with the other two to revise the standard
form contract they used to buy beets from nearby growers. Prior to the revision, growers’
receipts from refiners were based on a formula multiplying the number of pounds of beets
purchased by the percentage of the refiner’s net returns per pound of beets from sugar sales, all
adjusted by the tested sugar content of the grower’s beets over the period covered by the
contract.73

The revised contracts specified, instead, that the grower’s receipts were to be

determined bythe average net return of all three refiners combined.
The plaintiffs, a group of growers that had agreed to the revised contract, later brought an
action under the Sherman Act alleging the defendant’s actions illegally fixed the price of sugar
70
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beets and thereby restrained interstate commerce in sugar.74

Yet, the District Court judge

inferred just the opposite from the face of the contracts contained in the complaint, according to
which the price of sugar in interstate commerce determined the price the defendant paid per
pound of raw beets. To expedite an appeal on the question of federal jurisdiction he allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to eliminate the allegation that the defendant’s restraint
“affected the price of sugar in interstate commerce,” in essence replacing it with the charge that
the restraint of trade in beets, by itself, affected interstate commerce.75
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Rutledge found that the three refiners were the
only practical market for the petitioners’ beets owing to high transport costs and barriers to entry
by competing refiners.

As a result, the conspirators controlled the quantity of sugar

manufactured and sold in interstate commerce from northern California.76 In response to the
defendant’s claim that the three refiners were powerless to affect the national price of sugar,
Rutledge found “[t]he idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only raw material consumed in
an industry has no influence toward reducing competition in the distribution of the finished
product, in an integrated industry such as this, is impossible to accept.”77 Drawing on Wickard’s
horizontal aggregation principle, he reasoned that “Congress’ power to keep the interstate market
free of goods produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare . . . may be exercised in
individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce . . . . [I]t is
enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a general practice . . . contains a threat to
the interstate economy that requires preventive regulation.”78
In U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society (1952)79 the Court took a more limited approach
to federal commerce power. There, the government brought a civil action to enjoin various
medical associations and doctors that had formed together to provide affordable prepaid medical
plans to subscribing patients entirely within the state of Oregon.

Because the plans drew

providing doctors from patients’ local community, and because the doctors associated
themselves exclusively with either the state or the county medical society’s plan, the government
claimed the arrangements amounted to territorial allocations in restraint of interstate commerce
74
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under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Justice Jackson rejected the government’s claim,
noting there was no evidence of an attempt by the defendants to withhold medical service and the
only interstate commerce involved related to a few “sporadic” and “incidental” payments to
“out-of-state doctors” for patients who happened to be temporarily away from their local service
areas in Oregon. This was insufficient to show a restraint of trade in interstate commerce.
Instead, he reasoned that the government would have had to show interstate commerce was
adversely affected specifically by the “allocation of territories by doctor-sponsored plans, [but
as] far as any evidence brought to our attention discloses, the activities of the latter are wholly
intrastate.”80 In the antitrust setting, Justice Jackson apparently eschewed application of the
horizontal aggregation principle he had announced in Wickard. This surely would have allowed
him to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce if he had chosen to follow Justice
Rutledge’s use of horizontal aggregation in Mandeville.
In the midst of the Great Society programs of the 1960s, the Court handed down a
number of decisions dramatically expanding general federal commerce power under the
substantial effects test while failing to identify any principled limitation on its application.81 The
most obvious expansion was driven by the compelling social objective in the realm of civil
rights, where the underlying evil — racial discrimination — had little obvious connection to
commercial activity. The expansion is most clearly evident in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964),82
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964),83 and Daniel v. Paul (1969),84 where the
Court relied on both horizontal and vertical aggregation to show that the defendants’ apparently
local activities substantially affected interstate commerce.

The Court’s reasoning went

something like this. Even if a particular instance of racial discrimination in a local restaurant’s
food sales does not, by itself, substantially affect interstate commerce, it is sufficient if that
restaurant’s vertically-related inputs, say, its raw food supplies, are “in commerce.” This is
because the food supplies of all restaurants engaged in racial discrimination, when aggregated
horizontally, comprise a substantial portion of interstate commerce. If such restaurants were
80
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magically to vanish — that is, but-for their existence — the economic effect on the quantum or
character of interstate commerce would surely be substantial in some way.

These cases

explicitly reject any requirement that the party asserting Commerce Clause jurisdiction show a
nexus between the specific instance of racial discrimination and an effect on interstate
commerce.
By 1975, the vertical aggregation principle on which the Court relied in the civil rights
cases began to creep into its decisions on Sherman Act jurisdiction. In Goldfarb v. Virginia
(1975),85 the Court considered a challenge to the Fairfax County Bar Association’s (FCBA’s)
minimum fee schedule. When the plaintiffs were unable to find an attorney willing to perform
an examination for their residential real estate closing for a reduced fee, they filed a class action
suit claiming that the FCBA’s minimum fee schedule violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that as a practical matter title
examinations are indispensable to the financing of real estate transactions because lenders
require them as a condition for making a loan. Since a substantial volume of real estate loans
originated outside the state, and “given the substantial volume of commerce involved and the
inseparability of [title examinations] from the interstate aspects of real estate transactions,” he
concluded that “interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected,”86 regardless of whether the
fee schedule could be shown to reduce the number of title examinations or increase fees. Thus,
according to Burger’s assessment, but-for the availability of all title examinations aggregated
horizontally the market for a vertically-related input in the stream of commerce — real estate
financing — would surely suffer a substantial economic effect sufficient to support federal
jurisdiction.87
In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees (1976) the Court extended the cumulative
effects test to a local hospital’s alleged attempt to restrict the supply of hospital beds.88 The
substance of the petitioners claim was that the Rex Hospital and others conspired to monopolize
the hospital business in Raleigh, North Carolina, by attempting to prevent the petitioner from
expanding its hospital facilities in that market. Although the petitioner’s hospital business was
84
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strictly local, it asserted the necessary connection to interstate commerce because a substantial
portion of its own medicines and supplies, insurance proceeds, management services, and
construction loans came from outside the state. The District Court dismissed the petitioner’s
amended complaint because it failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the claimed violations
of the Sherman Act and interstate commerce, but in doing so it apparently failed clearly to
indicate whether it had based its dismissal on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the
petitioner’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Sitting en banc, the Court
of Appeals affirmed, finding that the petitioner’s hospital business was strictly local and that
since the amended complaint made no claim that the respondents’ actions had or would likely
have had an effect on any market price, the petitioner failed adequately to allege a substantial
effect on interstate commerce and thereby failed to state a claim.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. Stating that the basis for the District
Court’s dismissal was irrelevant, Justice Marshall argued that “[i]n either event, the critical
inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between respondents’ conduct and interstate commerce
that is alleged in the complaint.”89 Marshall went on to find that “[a]n effect can be ‘substantial’
under the Sherman Act even if its impact on interstate commerce falls far short of . . . affecting
market price.”90 He concluded that the petitioners complaint is wholly adequate to state a claim
in this case because it “fairly [alleges that the] conspiracy, to the extent it is successful, will place
‘unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted flow’ of interstate commerce.”91
In spite of the Court’s back-door acceptance of horizontal aggregation in Mandeville and
vertical aggregation in Goldfarb, most circuits continued to require Sherman Act plaintiff’s to
establish jurisdiction in either of two ways. The plaintiff could claim that the allegedly unlawful
conduct itself took place “in commerce” or that the allegedly unlawful conduct had a “substantial
effect” on interstate commerce, even though it took place intrastate. In McLain v. Real Estate
Bd. of New Orleans (1980), however, the Court found Sherman Act jurisdiction where the
defendants’ broader business activities, aggregated vertically, were in commerce even though the
allegedly unlawful conduct was not.92
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The plaintiff class of real estate buyers in McLain claimed that real estate brokers in the
Greater New Orleans area had engaged in a massive conspiracy to fix commission rates, split
fees, and suppress useful market information. The only connection between the conspiracy and
interstate commerce shown by the plaintiffs was that brokers routinely, though gratuitously,
advised buyers on how to obtain title insurance and financing, often from sources outside
Louisiana. The District Court found that the defendants’ brokerage activity occurred entirely in
Louisiana and that the plaintiffs failed to allege, as required by Goldfarb, that the provision of
insurance and financing constituted a large volume of interstate commerce inseparable from
brokerage services. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.93
Chief Justice Burger reversed the lower courts, finding they had misinterpreted Goldfarb.
That case, he asserted, addressed the “in commerce” test rather than the “substantial effects” test.
To establish that the defendants’ activities were in the stream of commerce, it was necessary to
show that they were an “integral part of an interstate transaction.” As in the case at hand, such a
showing is unnecessary where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is the substantial effects
test, which is “in no way restricted to those challenged activities that have an integral
relationship to an activity in interstate commerce.”94 As Burger described the substantial effects
test:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it would
be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate
commerce generated by respondents’ [broader] brokerage activity. Petitioners
need not make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate
commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those
other aspects of respondents’ activity that are alleged to be unlawful. . . . If
establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had
an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a
demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive
effect. This is not the rule of our cases.95
Given the uncontroverted testimony from local lenders that an appreciable amount of
their residential real estate loans occurred in interstate commerce, Burger concluded that “there
93
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remains only the requirement that respondents’ activities which allegedly have been infected by
a price-fixing conspiracy be shown ‘as a matter of practical economics’ to have a not
insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved.”96 The infected activities version of the
substantial effects test apparently requires the plaintiff to allege only that the defendants’
unlawful conduct stands to have a “not insubstantial effect” on interstate commerce because,
being interstate, the defendants’ broader vertically-related business activities — such as title
insurance and real estate financing — can be presumed to have a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce when aggregated horizontally across all defendants. That is, but-for the
defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct the economic effect on the quantum or character of
interstate commerce would be substantial, and this, according to Burger, was enough to carry the
plaintiffs’ jurisdictional burden.
Finally, in Summit the Court established its most expansive version of the substantial
effects test, finding that a Sherman Act defendant’s entire line of business can be infected by an
economically trivial local restraint. The plaintiff in that case was a licensed and very skilled eye
surgeon who refused to hire the services of a physician’s assistant as required by the defendants’
hospital policy. In response, the defendants — including the hospital at which the plaintiff held
staff privileges, its parent corporation, and several of the plaintiff’s fellow doctors who served on
the hospital’s peer review board — initiated peer review proceedings resulting in severe
restrictions on the plaintiff’s practice and an impending group boycott of his services by the
defendants and other hospitals throughout the Los Angeles area. The plaintiff filed a complaint
in federal court alleging, among other things, that the defendants had conspired to drive him out
of the Los Angeles market by boycotting his services in an effort to increase their market share.
To establish federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
corporate parent’s hospitals served nonresident patients, received reimbursements from out-ofstate insurers and the federal government, purchased supplies from the stream of commerce, and
distributed peer review reports across state lines. In response to the defendants’ contention that
the plaintiff’s complaint failed to describe an adequate nexus between the alleged group boycott
and interstate commerce, the District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals
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reversed, finding that “‘as a matter of practical economics’ the hospital’s ‘peer review process in
general’ obviously affected interstate commerce.”97
Writing for a the majority,98 Justice Stevens’s found that the petitioner was
unquestionably engaged in interstate commerce even though its primary activity involved the
provision of general health care services in a local market. Echoing the Court of Appeals,
Stevens reasoned that, “[a]s ‘a matter of practical economics,’ the effect of such a conspiracy on
the hospital’s ‘purchases of out-of-state medicines and supplies as well as its revenues from outof-state insurance companies,’ would establish the necessary interstate nexus.”99 In response to
the petitioners’ claim that a boycott of a single surgeon was insufficient to establish jurisdiction,
Stevens reasoned that the mere existence of an illegal agreement violates the Act regardless of its
actual effects and that, if successful, the conspiracy would surely have reduced the supply of eye
surgery in the Los Angeles market. Quoting McLean, he found that the respondent “need not
make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged
conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of respondents’ activity that are
alleged to be unlawful.”100 What is more, according to Stevens, “[t]he competitive significance
of respondent’s exclusion from the market must be measured, not just by a particularized
evaluation of his own practice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the impact of the restraint
on other participants and potential participants in the market from which he has been
excluded.”101
In dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that the Act’s language, “in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states,”102 does indeed require the Court to examine the nature and
likely effect of the restraint in each particular case. In his view, McLain’s “infected activity” test
was the result of the Court’s confusion over the law; the Court could easily have found
jurisdiction in McLain given the massive conspiracy being alleged, but instead it resorted to the
infected activities test under the mistaken belief that “focusing upon the effects of the restraint
itself would require plaintiffs to prove their case at the jurisdictional stage. That belief was in
error because the prior approach had simply assumed, rather than required proof of, the success
97
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of the conspiracy.”103 As a result, Justice Scalia lamented, the Court missed an opportunity to
clear up the confusion in the circuits following McLain and had in fact made things worse. To
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction in this case, he observed:

[The Court] looks neither to the effect on commerce of the restraint, nor to the
effect on commerce of the defendants’ infected activity, but rather, it seems, to
the effect on commerce of the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded.
As I understand the Court’s opinion, the test of Sherman Act jurisdiction is
whether the entire line of commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded
affects interstate commerce. Since excluding him from eye surgery at Midway
Hospital effectively excluded him from the entire Los Angeles market for eye
surgery . . . the jurisdictional question is simply whether that market affects
interstate commerce, which of course it does. This analysis tells us nothing about
the substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated by the particular
conduct at issue here.
Determining the “market” for a product or service, meaning the scope of
other products or services against which it must compete, is of course necessary
for many purposes of antitrust analysis. But today’s opinion does not identify a
relevant “market” in that sense. It declares Los Angeles to be the pertinent
“market” only because that is the entire scope of Dr. Pinhas’ exclusion from
practice. . . . I cannot understand why “market” in the Court’s peculiar sense has
any bearing upon this restraint’s impact on interstate commerce, and hence upon
Sherman Act jurisdiction. The Court does not even attempt to provide an
explanation. 104
Thus, the Court took vertical and horizontal aggregation to the extreme; but-for the entire
Los Angeles market for eye surgery, the effect on the quantum or character of interstate
commerce would be substantial, and the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to establish federal
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia emphasized the absurdity of the Court’s but-for approach in pointedly
observing that if “the alleged conspirators in the present case had decided to effectuate the
ultimate exclusion of Dr. Pinhas, i.e., to have him killed, it would be absurd to think that the
world market in eye surgery would thereby be affected.”105

The Court’s inference that

competition in the Los Angeles market could have been affected by the exclusion of a single
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surgeon from the Los Angeles market therefore ignores the “‘practical economics’ of the
matter.”106

D. The Post-Modern Era?

Beginning in the early 1990s, the Court began to limit the scope of federal commerce
power. The ensuring line of cases raises the prospect that the Rehnquist Court has entered a
post-modern era in which it will continue to set limits on Congress’s regulatory authority under
the Commerce Clause. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen, but the case law thus far
suggests that the Court has embraced the framework of competitive federalism in this field to
guide its decisions.
In New York v. United States (1992),107 the Court addressed the limits imposed on federal
regulatory authority by the Tenth Amendment. There, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act (1985) imposed on states the obligation to dispose of radioactive waste
generated within their borders. The Act provided for a system of incentives to encourage the
states to comply with this obligation. Among other things, the “take title” incentive required
states that fail to provide for disposal of radioactive waste generated within the state to assume
title and take possession of the waste and to bear any liability imposed on the generator arising
from their failure to do so.
The State of New York and two of its counties brought suit against the United States,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the incentive system was in conflict with the Tenth
Amendment. The Court found that, although severable from the rest of the Act, the take title
incentive was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore fell outside Congress’s enumerated
powers. In Justice O’Conner’s words:

Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct
order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress,
it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the
two. . . . Either way, ‘the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States
106
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by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,’ .
. . Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress'
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved
by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure
of our Government established by the Constitution.”108

In U.S. v. Lopez (1995) the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act,
specifically rejecting unconstrained aggregation to establish a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.109 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority, “possession of a gun in a local
school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. [To hold otherwise] would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the states.”110

In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted the many

inconsistencies in the substantial effects test and singled out the aggregation principle for special
criticism. In his view, under this principle,

Congress can regulate whole categories of activities that are not themselves either
“interstate” or “commerce.” In applying the [substantial] effects test, we ask
whether the class of activities as a whole substantially affects interstate
commerce, not whether any specific activity within the class has such effects
when considered in isolation. . . . The aggregation principle is clever, but has no
stopping point. . . . [O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an
activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on
commerce. 111
In U.S. v. Morrison (2000) the Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act, specifically rejecting Congress’s reliance on the aggregation
principle to establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce.112 According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, it is unworkable to extrapolate a “but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of
violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If accepted, [this]
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated
108
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impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption.”113
Various justices in Lopez and Morrison implicitly relied on the framework of competitive
federalism as a basis for resolving the balance of dual sovereignty. In Lopez, Justices Kennedy
and O’Connor emphasized the importance of political innovation. In their words:

While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would
argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises,
considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal. In this
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions where the best solution is far from clear. . . . If a State or municipality
determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students
from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the States are
sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal
laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.114
More recently, in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(2001),115 the Court struck down the Corps’ regulation of “isolated wetlands” pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Rule (1986). In the majority’s view, the rulemaking authority Congress granted
to the Corps under the Clean Water Act (1972) lacked the clear expression of Congressional
intent to encroach on the traditional state police powers necessary to support the Migratory Bird
Rule. Notable in this decision is Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by three other justices, which
makes a strong theoretical case for competitive federalism as a basis for federal regulation:
The migratory bird rule does not blur the “distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local.” . . . Justice Holmes cogently observed in
Missouri v. Holland that the protection of migratory birds is a textbook example
of a national problem. . . . The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like
so many other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a
new landfill) are disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer
migratory birds) are widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other
States. In such situations, described by economists as involving “externalities,”
federal regulation is both appropriate and necessary.116
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Nothing in this statement is inconsistent the reasoning the majority used to arrive at its decision.
It appears simply that the majority considered migratory bird populations’ use of isolated
wetlands to be so remote from Congress’s purpose in passing the Act that the Corps’ adoption of
the Migratory Bird Rule required a specific Congressional grant of rule making authority.

II.

PRACTICAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS

“If two children operating competing lemonade stands decided to fix prices, the effect on
interstate commerce would be trivial.” .’”117

Early on in the development of Sherman Act case law the Court groped for a clear
standard by which to evaluate trade restraints. Candidates included the “preservation of small
dealers and worthy men,” the maintenance of reasonable prices, the maintenance of large
numbers of competitors, the fragmentation of markets, and the suppression of “great
aggregations of capital.”118 The result was a confused and often pernicious body of antitrust
precedents. Antitrust scholars and jurists now largely agree that the exclusive goal of the
Sherman Act and other antitrust laws is to promote “consumer welfare,” as most forcefully
advanced by Robert Bork.119

According to the consumer welfare standard, business

arrangements that create market power invariably generate allocative inefficiency reflected in
reduced output and higher prices to consumers.120
117
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productive efficiency by integrating operations and lowering production costs, which tends to
increase output and lower prices. Consumer welfare is best served by prohibiting business
arrangements whose probable net effect is to reduce output and raise prices; that is, to restrain
trade.
Based on the consumer welfare standard, Bork rationalized the use of a per se rule against
“naked” horizontal restraints of trade such as price fixing, proposed a market share test for
horizontal mergers, and persuasively argued that all vertical restraints should be subject to a full
evidentiary inquiry under the rule of reason. As a result, the case law has become clearer and
more predictable, with the adoption of an output test to distinguish per se restraints from those
best addressed under a full reasonableness inquiry, a full reasonableness inquiry for vertical
division of territories and vertical maximum retail prices, and a virtual presumption that
predatory pricing is economically irrational. Horizontal merger policy has evolved toward a
workable set of market share tests for identifying the mergers antitrust agencies can be expected
to challenge for the likely exercise of market power.
Part A of this section briefly describes the simple economics of market power. Part B
describes the practical analytical framework the antitrust agencies use to identify the extent of
the market for assessing the effect of horizontal mergers on market power. Part C briefly
describes how this framework can be adapted to assess the scope of price effects for the purpose
of establishing federal jurisdiction under the geographic market power test.

A. The Economics of Market Power

Consider an isolated island economy in which there are a large number consumers and
100 wealth maximizing widget firms, all of whom face the same production technology and
therefore operate at the same scale.121 For simplicity, assume consumers believe there are no
close substitutes for widgets and that any transaction costs consumers would ordinarily face in
arbitraging the price of widgets across firms are zero.

Under these circumstances, the

“representative” firm shown in Figure 1 illustrates a competitive widget market in which no firm
is able to exercise market power and resources are allocated efficiently. DR reflects this firm’s
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pro rata share of total market demand for widgets and MC reflects its marginal cost of producing
widgets. DR slopes down because the value consumers place on additional widgets declines as
their consumption rate rises. MC slopes up because the value of the resources taken from other
sectors of the economy to produce widgets increases as the rate of widget production rises.122
The intersection of DR and MC determines the equilibrium market price, P*, and the
representative firm’s rate of production, Q*.
Because the marginal value consumers place on widgets is exactly equal to the marginal
cost of widget production, this equilibrium achieves allocative efficiency in the sense that it
maximizes the surplus value of widget production.

The representative firm collects P*Q*

revenue from consumers and earns producer surplus equal to area DFI, while consumers earn a
surplus equal to area DFA.123 There is no way to reallocate resources to improve one party’s
welfare without reducing another party’s welfare by a greater amount.
It is important to understand that DR is not the demand curve perceived by the
representative firm if it considers adjusting its rate of output unilaterally. Rather, DR indicates its
pro rata share of total market sales to consumers if all firms charge the same price. If the price
of inputs critical to the widget production process were to decline, for example, MC would shift
down and its intersection with DR would accurately describe the resulting equilibrium for the
representative firm. All firms would increase their production rate and decrease price identically
because consumers would stand ready to arbitrage any price differences between firms. If any
single firm unilaterally lowers price even slightly below P*, consumers would react by offering
to shift all their purchases to it. Since the firm can sell as many widgets as it wants at P*,
however, it has no incentive to lower price. Alternatively, consumers would react decisively to
even a modest increase in price above P* by a single firm, shifting all their purchases to the
remaining 99 firms and leaving the recalcitrant firm with zero sales.124 Thus, if any single firm
considers adjusting price, while other firms maintain price at P*, it faces a demand curve equal to
D* that is horizontal, or perfectly elastic, at P*. Because the firm receives P* on every unit it
sells, D* is coincident with its marginal revenue curve, MR*. Recognizing it can have no
122
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influence on the market price by adjusting production, the firm takes the competitive market
price as given and is completely devoid of market power.
It is fairly easy to see the effects of market power by hypothesizing that the island’s
widget firms suddenly gain the ability to coordinate production, either by colluding or by
merging into a single firm. By coordinating, they are able to exercise market power, which is
simply the ability to raise price above P* without experiencing a complete loss of sales. Unlike
the situation described above, the representative firm now perceives a demand curve equal to DR.
Since DR is downward sloping, as the firm raises price it sells fewer widgets, but because
consumers have imperfect substitutes for widgets they do not reduce their purchases to zero.
Under the standard assumption that firms must charge a uniform price for all the widgets it sells,
the representative firm’s marginal revenue is now shown by MRR.125 To maximize wealth, the
firm reduces its rate of output to QC, where MRR intersects MC, and then charges the highest
possible uniform price at which all QC widgets can be sold. This occurs at PC. The motivation
for exercising market power is that it may increase the firm’s total surplus, now equal to total
revenue (PCQC) minus the area under MC up to QC. This corresponds to area BCHI.126
The problem with market power is not specifically that it allows colluding widget firms
to earn additional profits, but that it allows them to earn additional profits by reducing output
below Q*, which leads to allocative inefficiency. At the lower production rate of QC, the value
consumers place on the marginal widget increases to PC, while the cost of the marginal widget in
terms of the value of resources forgone in production falls to MCC. The difference is what Frank
Easterbrook has characterized as the “monopoly overcharge.”127 Too few widgets are produced,
too few resources are devoted to widget production, and too many resources are devoted to nonwidget sectors of the economy where they provide a smaller surplus. Consumers would have
valued the production that has been lost equal to the area under DR from Q* to QC, while the
costs saved are equal only to the area under MC between these two points. In total, the island
economy loses consumer and producer surplus equal to area CFH, often characterized as the
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deadweight loss due to monopoly or simply as the welfare triangle.128 Unlike the situation
depicted above in which widget firms are unable to coordinate, resources can now be reallocated
to improve the parties’ net welfare, and this is exactly what the Sherman Act is designed to
achieve under the consumer welfare standard.
The exercise of market power under these circumstances is a textbook example of a
market failure, in which the decision maker — the organization of colluding firms — is unable to
capture the full benefit from expanding output because some of the benefit spills over to
consumers. This is because the private benefit to colluding firms, reflected by MRR, declines
more rapidly as production rises than the social benefit to consumers, reflected by DR. The
market failure is a direct result of the requirement that the cartel charge a uniform price for all
the widgets it sells. Starting at any arbitrary price and production rate along DR in Figure 1, to
increase sales under the uniform price constraint the cartel must reduce price on the additional
widgets it wants to sell and on the widgets it would have sold absent the price reduction. The
price reduction on these intramarginal widgets spills over to consumers, who otherwise would
have purchased them at the higher price. The firm naturally fails to consider the spillover in
determining its wealth maximizing rate of production; it produces too little because it is unable
to realize the full value of production as revenue, hence the market failure.
Many of the trade restraints addressed by the Sherman Act arise from horizontal
arrangements between firms that would otherwise act as rivals.

Horizontal arrangements

involving no integration of productive activity are considered the most likely to result in the
exercise of market power.

The most obvious example is collusive agreements between

independent firms to restrict production and raise prices. Horizontal division of territories or
customer allocations between independent firms can have the same effect on production and
prices. These are thought to be the most serious types of horizontal trade restraints because the
participating firms remain independent. As a result, they are treated as unreasonable per se in
the antitrust case law.129 Horizontal mergers between competing firms can also lead to reduced
output and increased prices, but given that the participating firms integrate their productive
128
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activities antitrust economists believe any resulting allocative inefficiency may be offset by
productive efficiencies that allow the new firm to cut production costs and possibly prices.130
These types of restraints are evaluated with a full evidentiary inquiry into their reasonableness.

B. Market Definition and Market Power

As Justice Scalia noted in his Summitdissent, antitrust analysis requires the definition of
an appropriate market. The foregoing model can be used as the basis for identifying the extent of
the market and assessing the likely affect of trade restraints on market power. It is important to
keep in mind that there is no theoretically “correct” market in any given setting; the broader the
market as defined, all else being equal, the smaller the combined market share of a specific group
of coordinating firms and the less likely their restraint is to create market power. There are two
dimensions to any market definition, the relevant product and the relevant geographic scope.
Because our ultimate concern is the proper limit of Sherman Act jurisdiction — an inherently
spatial concern — our primary focus is on the geographic scope of the market, although before
proceeding it is necessary to briefly explain how to identify the relevant product.
In describing the widget market on our hypothetical island economy, we finessed the
problem of defining the relevant product by assuming widgets have no close substitutes in
consumers’ perception. In reality, if a group of firms raises the price of their product relative to
competing products, consumers are likely to substitute the low-priced product for the high-priced
product, thereby limiting the firms’ ability to sustain the price increase. Consumers’ willingness
to substitute between alternatives in the face of a relative price change determines the extent of
the product market. In antitrust law, the more closely two goods compete the more likely they
are to be considered in the same product market precisely because variations in their relative
prices are will cause consumers to substitute between them.
It is fairly easy to imagine that widgets compete for consumers’ favor with other products
within a broader product category, just as aluminum ingot competes with other metals,
cellophane competes with other flexible wrapping materials, and Brand X CD players compete
with other audio equipment such as FM radios, cassette players, and DVD players. Naturally,
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the broader the product category the less likely it is to have viable substitutes and the more likely
a price increase is to persist. In the face of an increase in the price of Brand X CD players,
consumers are very likely to find viable substitutes among other brands of CD players and all
other types of audio equipment. In the face of an increase in the price of all brands of CD
players, however, consumers are far less likely to find viable substitutes among all other types of
audio equipment. How to identify suitably close substitutes in practice is a question that must
ultimately be answered empirically.

Based on cross-elasticities between substitute product

categories, economists can in principle identify the most narrowly defined product category for
which a price increase is likely to persist if imposed by all sellers of that product. This product
category identifies the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.
To determine whether a given restraint is likely to result in the creation of market power
we must also identify the relevant geographic market. The geographic scope of an economic
market has been defined as “that set of demanders and suppliers whose trading establishes the
price of a good [and] ‘within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being
made for transportation costs’.”131 A workable empirical test for this definition is “the similarity
of price movements within the market.”132

But neither this definition, nor its empirical

counterpart, are especially useful in an antitrust setting because they assume the events that cause
prices to change are be beyond the discretion of market participants. By way of example, in the
island widget economy we hypothesized an exogenous economy-wide decline in the price of
inputs critical to the widget production process and found that arbitrage would cause all firms to
increase output and reduce price. In antitrust, however, the focus is on the ability of a group of
coordinating firms to restrict output and raise price by restraining trade to market power. Since
the island’s economic market had distinct limits due to its geographic isolation, a hypothetical
cartel of all widget firms was able to do this successfully.
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What has been characterized as the “geographic antitrust market” may be either broader
or narrower than the economic market.133 The accepted method of identifying the geographic
antitrust market is the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is formalized in the Merger
Guidelines and used by the antitrust agencies to assess the probable effect of horizontal mergers
on market power.134 According to this test, for any pair of firms proposing to merge the antitrust
market is defined as the narrowest geographic area containing the merging firms in which all
firms in the area, by coordinating their operating decisions, can profitably sustain a small but
significant increase in the price of the relevant product above what would prevail absent the
restraint.135
To show how this test works, we return to our isolated island economy. For simplicity,
assume the island is perfectly round and that consumers and producers are evenly distributed
within its borders, depicted by Circle E in Figure 2. We assume transportation costs for all firms
on the island increase at a constant rate with distance. We then consider a subgroup of firms that
include the firms proposing to merge, say those within Circle A, and ask whether, by acting in
concert they can profitably sustain a small but significant increase in the price of widgets. If not,
then Circle A does not represent a geographic market for antitrust purposes because no single
firm or narrower subgroup of firms within Circle A could hope to sustain a price increase if all
the firms in Circle A acting together are unable to do so. The geographic antitrust market is
broader than Circle A because outside firms must be added to the subgroup before it can hope to
exercise market power. Suppose we expand the subgroup to include all firms in Circle B and
again find that these firms acting together are unable profitably to sustain a price increase. By
proceeding incrementally in this fashion, we can identify the narrowest geographic market in
which the associated firms are capable of exercising market power. Suppose this coincides with
Circle C.
The geographic antitrust market, depicted in Circle C, may be narrower than the entire
island economy. For this to be true the firms outside Circle C must have sufficiently limited
productive capacity that they are unable to expand output enough to completely undermine the
133
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cartel. With the higher price set by the firms inside Circle C, outside firms will attempt to
arbitrage the price difference by expanding their production and selling into the colluders’
market. As they do so they will succeed in taking a portion of sales away from the colluders, but
their marginal production costs eventually increase so much that they are no longer willing to
expand. The resulting hypothetical equilibrium is one in which prices throughout the island
economy are higher than they would be absent the colluders’ exercise of market power, with any
price differences reflecting transportation costs. This condition confirms that the entire island is
an economic market even though the antitrust market is narrower.
There is nothing in this analysis that requires us to start the hypothetical monopolist test
with Circle A. Quite the contrary; in the context of a real merger proposal the antitrust agencies
begin with the narrowest geographic area that includes the merging firms, and of course they
recognize that consumers are not uniformly distributed across space and that transportation costs
can vary for many reasons. If, using the hypothetical monopolist test, the agencies find that
these firms would be unable profitably to sustain a small price increase they search for the
narrowest geographic area that includes the next-best substitute for production at the merging
firms’ location and ask whether all firms in this area acting together could do so.
Once having identified the geographic antitrust market in this way, the antitrust agencies
attempt to determine whether a merger, presumably between only two firms, is likely to generate
market power absent the cooperation of the nonmerging firms. Obviously, the smaller the
merging firms’ combined share of the geographic antitrust market the less likely they are to
possess market power given that a hypothetical monopoly of all firms is just barely able to
sustain a profitable price increase. The agencies account for market shares by calculating the
share of production attributable to each firm in the market. They then calculate the HirfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) for the market by summing the firms’ squared market shares. For
example, if the market contains five firms each of which have market share of 20%, the HHI for
the market is (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) = .2, or 2000 by convention. The HHI gives
proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms reflecting the belief that a
firm’s influence in coordinating production in the market is more than proportionate to its market
share. The antitrust agencies consider an HHI below 1000 to reflect an unconcentrated market.
An HHI between 1000 and 1800 is said to be moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 1800
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is said to be concentrated, although it is widely understood that these thresholds are imprecise
and somewhat arbitrary indicators of market power.
The agencies starting point for analysis of a given merger is to identify the defendants’
geographic antitrust market, calculate the HHI, and then calculate the change in the HHI that
would result from the proposed merger. As already explained, the resulting calculation is
imprecise, among other reasons because the effect of the merger on the defendants’ combined
market share will depend critically on the extent to which the merger generates productive
efficiencies. A merger that generates few productive efficiencies while creating market power in
the geographic antitrust market is likely to reduce the defendants’ combined market share over
time, while a merger that generates substantial productive efficiencies while creating little
market power is likely to increase the defendants combined market share over time.
For unconcentrated markets, the agencies presume little or no effect of the merger on the
HHI. For markets whose post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the agencies presume a
merger that increases HHI by less than 100 is unlikely to create market power, while a merger
that increase HHI by more than 100 raises significant concerns over the creation of market
power.

For markets in which the HHI exceeds 1800 the agencies presume a merger that

increases HHI by less than 50 is unlikely to create market power, while a merger that increase
HHI by more than 50 raises significant concerns over the creation of market power. Where the
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, the agencies presume that mergers producing an increase in the
HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise.136
It is important to understand that the antitrust agencies face a tradeoff in identifying the
geographic antitrust market. The wider the product and geographic market to which they apply
the hypothetical monopolist test, the more likely it is that a hypothetical monopolist would be
able to exercise market power in that market. But by increasing the scope of the market in this
way, they necessarily reduce the combined market share of the firms proposing to merger.
Presumably, the agencies’ recognition of this tradeoff at least partly explains why they identify
the geographic antitrust market as the narrowest market in which a hypothetical monopolist
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could profitably sustain an increase in price.137 In practice, the agencies use market share
thresholds established under the Merger Guidelines as crude proxies for the creation and
probable exercise of market power, and the exact magnitude of the thresholds can therefore be
adjusted to reflect the choice of the narrowest market. Federal courts are not bound by the
Merger Guidelines,138 but nevertheless many federal courts follow their approach to product and
geographic market definition.139 This is because the Merger Guidelines “represent mainstream
economic thinking,” and are functionally equivalent to other tests that the courts have developed
over the years.

C. Adapting the Guidelines to the Issue of Jurisdiction

Rather than focusing on the geographic scope of the price increase resulting from a given
horizontal merger, the Merger Guidelines focus solely on whether the merger is likely to
generate market power. To be useful in the context of a jurisdictional challenge it is therefore
necessary to adapt the Merger Guidelines’ underlying logic to assess the geographic scope of
price effects resulting from market power. For example, the geographic antitrust market as
defined according to the hypothetical monopolist test is likely to overlap one or more economic
markets, “within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being made for
transportation costs.”

An exercise of market power will cause a flow of goods into the

geographic antitrust market as outside firms expand production in an attempt to arbitrage price
differences within these overlapping economic markets. To some extent, prices will therefore
rise outside the geographic antitrust market, possibly spilling over to neighboring states. Unless
the defendants combined share of the geographic antitrust market is 100%, however, any such
spillovers are less likely to occur. In defining the relevant market for antitrust jurisdiction, a
proper test should formally recognize the tradeoff between the likelihood of interstate price
spillovers and the likelihood the defendants can effectively exercise market power within the
geographic antitrust market as defined.
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III.

THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET POWER TEST FOR SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTION

“If two children operating competing lemonade stands decided to fix prices, the
effect on interstate commerce would be trivial . . . . ”140
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution states that the federal courts have the power to
adjudicate only “cases” or “controversies” “arising under” the Constitution and the “Laws of the
United States.”141 This passage establishes an important limitation on federal court jurisdiction
that goes to the very heart of sovereignty. If a case or controversy does not arise under the
Constitution or a federal statute, federal courts lack jurisdiction over the subject matter. “The
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘springs from the nature and
limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception’.”142
Because the federal judicial power is limited, it is well settled that parties seeking redress in
federal court must allege the facts necessary to support subject matter jurisdiction, and the court
is free at any time during the proceedings to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when the necessary
facts come to light. In principle, the defendant has the right to rebut these allegations by
presenting contrary evidence.143 If the party asserting federal jurisdiction, say, a civil plaintiff
suing under Section I of the Sherman Act for treble damages, is unable to provide substantial
competence evidence to overcome the defendants’ rebuttal, the defendants can move to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure of subject matter
jurisdiction, which thereby will be defeated.144
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To establish Sherman Act jurisdiction under the geographic market power test, the
plaintiff must allege the defendants engaged in a restraint of trade that generated (or if successful
would be reasonably likely to generate) market power that caused prices to rise in more states
than one. More particularly, the complainant must allege that 1) the defendants supplied a
particular product, 2) the defendants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade for the sale of that product, 3) the geographic antitrust market for the
defendant’s product was sufficiently large that a hypothetical monopolist could plausibly affect
prices in more states than one, and 4) the defendants’ activity generated sufficient market power
within the geographic antitrust market to restrain trade and raise prices. As under the Merger
Guidelines, market concentration could be expressed in terms of the HHI, and the likelihood the
restraint, if successful, would generate market power could be based on the associated change in
HHI from combining the defendants’ market share.
In essence, the above procedures for establishing jurisdiction under the Act require the
party asserting jurisdiction to allege a substantive nexus between the prohibited restraint and the
interstate spillover that provides the foundation for federal jurisdiction. Chief Justice Burger
rejected this approach in McClainbecause he thought it would require the plaint iff to establish
its entire substantive claim at the jurisdictional stage. Justice Scalia correctly pointed out in his
Summit dissent that Burger was mistaken because the Court was free to assume the success of the
conspiracy and to evaluate the jurisdictional question accordingly. Under the geographic market
jurisdiction, and should be dealt with as a 12(b)(6) motion). We feel that it is a 12(b)(1) matter for three reasons.
First, subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with the power of the court to hear the case in the first place and is
clearly regarded as a threshold issue. Steel Company, 88, 94. The language “among the several states” was
essential to establish Congress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, the court needs to
inquire into whether the alleged restraint could plausibly affect interstate commerce before hearing the merits of the
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considered, the FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is, by the express terms of FRCP 12(b), converted into a motion
for summary judgment.”).). Under the rules of notice pleading, the plaintiff can establish jurisdiction for the time
being by properly pleading the facts in good faith, even if they are later controverted. The court should be permitted
to hear defendants’ offer of proof regarding the validity of the pleadings, just as it might if a case was brought under
diversity jurisdiction and the parties were citizens of the same state. Finally, dismissal on grounds of jurisdiction
usually does not have res judicata effects, and this will allow the plaintiff to pursue his claims in state court, if
possible. Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, (N.D. Ill. 2000); Hitt v. City of Pasadena,
561 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1977). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, usually result in the plaintiff
being given leave to amend, and the plaintiff will then allege facts, irrefutable at the pleadings stage, to establish
jurisdiction. Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, (N.D. Ill. 2000). But in principle, the
defendants have the right to rebut the plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding jurisdiction.
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power test, a conspiracy to fix prices might be locally successful and yet the defendants’ share of
an interstate geographic antitrust market might be so small that the conspiracy could not
plausibly be alleged raise prices outside the state. Alternatively, the plaintiff might prevail on
the jurisdictional question but ultimately fail on the merits by being unable to prove the existence
of a conspiracy. Thus, proof of the conspiracy and its actual effects are invariably preserved for
a trial on the merits.
The geographic market power test imposes an economically appropriate tradeoff on the
plaintiff when alleging jurisdiction under the Act. The narrower the market the plaintiff alleges
the more likely a restraint by the defendants will generate market power. The narrower the
market, however, the less likely a hypothetical monopolist could increase prices outside the state.
Plaintiffs will naturally want to allege the narrowest market consistent with the plausible
allegation of interstate price spillovers because this maximizes the defendants’ measured share of
the market, the HHI, and the resulting change in the HHI. The defendants can respond by
offering to prove they have such a small share of the market that any exercise of market power is
economically implausible. Alternatively, they can offer to prove that the geographic antitrust
market alleged by the plaintiff is so narrow even a hypothetical monopolist would be unlikely to
sustain a profitable price increase that substantially spilled across state lines. On either showing,
the defendants’ conduct would be presumptively intrastate and unless rebutted by the plaintiff
would be sufficient to support a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
One of the attractive attributes of the geographic market power test is that it imposes a
tradeoff on the plaintiff’s reliance on vertical aggregation without strictly preventing it, thereby
providing the plaintiff with the flexibility to define the market according to the facts at its
disposal and the circumstances of the particular restraint at issue. This is because defining the
product category broadly to include vertically-related goods or services raises the plaintiff’s
evidentiary burden regarding the defendants’ HHI and change-in-HHI.

As in McLain, for

example, the plaintiffs would be free to allege a relatively broad product category that includes
complements to real estate brokerage such as financing and title insurance. Although unlikely, it
is economically possible that fixed minimum brokerage fees in the greater New Orleans area
would cause such a dramatic decline in the number of real estate transactions that the price of
financing and title insurance outside the state would substantially decline, possibly supporting a
Sherman Act claims by lenders or title insurers. Including financing and title insurance in the
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product definition increases the likelihood a hypothetical monopoly of the broad product
category in the Greater New Orleans area would have substantial interstate price effects. At the
same time, however, by reducing the defendants’ combined market share it raises the plaintiff’s
burden of demonstrating that their restraint could plausibly have such an effect.145 In any event,
under the geographic market power test the likely interstate scope of price effects is a question of
fact that Sherman Act defendants have a threshold right to resolve as a jurisdictional matter.
The tradeoff imposed by the geographic market power test has similar implications for
horizontal aggregation. The plaintiff is free to allege a geographic antitrust market sufficiently
broad that a hypothetical monopolist would be extremely likely to sustain a profitable increase in
prices outside the state in question, but defining the market broadly raises the plaintiff’s
jurisdictional burden elsewhere. As in Mandeville, for example, the Court hypothesized that the
effect on interstate commerce would be substantial if all sugar refiners in the country adopted the
same grower contracts as the defendant.

In essence, the Court applied the hypothetical

monopolist test to the national market and concluded that interstate sugar prices would thereby
suffer a substantial effect. But the Court neglected to recognize that the refiners’ share of such a
broadly defined geographic antitrust market was absolutely trivial and beyond any plausible
suggestion of market power. Whereas such unconstrained aggregation may be appropriate to
establish constitutional jurisdiction in cases such as Wickard, where Congress has made specific
findings as to the need for federal regulation, it is inappropriate to establish jurisdiction under
general prohibitions such as the Sherman Act that require “a particularized judicial
determination” in light of the circumstances at hand and the underlying goal of the statute.
Note that the geographic market power test in no way recognizes formalistic distinctions.
Applied to the facts in E.C. Knight, for example, the geographic market power test would surely
have found that the defendants’ “manufacturing” operations caused sugar prices to rise in more
states than one, and the Court in Standard Oil was correct in rejecting E.C. Knight. Neither does
the geographic market power test rely on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects,
although it will ordinarily give effects that are economically remote from the defendants’
145

Similarly, as in Summit, the plaintiff would be free to allege that the relevant product category includes an entire
collection of vertically-related activities associated with general hospital services and that the relevant geographic
antitrust market is the entire Los Angeles area. A hypothetical monopoly in such a broadly defined market well
might cause the price of eye surgery to increase in neighboring states, but the exclusion of a single eye surgeon, or
even a general firm policy of excluding surgeons from the market under prescribed circumstances would be
extremely unlikely to generate market power.
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restraint limited weight in the jurisdictional calculus. What is more, whether the defendants’
goods are in the stream of commerce is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to establish
federal jurisdiction. An effective restraint by firms whose sales are entirely within their home
state may cause prices to increase outside the state even though the defendants’ goods never
cross state lines. Indeed, the likely effect of such a restraint would be to increase the flow of
competitors’ goods into the state and reduce the flow, if any, of the defendants’ goods out of the
state. Alternatively, the defendants may sell their goods in a national market in which they have
absolutely no hope of affecting prices, even though they have market power in their local
intrastate market. The sole question relevant to Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the alleged
restraint affects prices outside any state in which the restraint operates.
A second attractive feature of the geographic market power test is that it need not be
applied identically to all restraints.

No jurisdictional test can be expected to perform without

error, but the geographic market power test establishes a substantively reasoned basis for
Sherman Act jurisdiction that allows the legal system to iterate toward an articulate set of
presumptions that minimize the weighted sum of Type I and Type II errors.146 In the context of
antitrust, judicial measurement error is small enough that practical market share thresholds for
HHI and changes in HHI can be established for various categories of restraints. Below these
thresholds the exercise of market power is economically implausible and presumptively beyond
federal jurisdiction. Different restraints would very likely be subject to different presumptions
regarding the thresholds necessary for the plaintiff to make out a prime facie case for federal
jurisdiction. In all cases determination of the appropriate threshold would properly be tempered
by the Courts’ recognition that the category of alleged restraints may, in fact, generate productive
efficiencies that more than offset any associated allocative inefficiencies. Obvious horizontal
pricing arrangements would no doubt be subject to a very low threshold, possibly approaching
zero as is currently the case, because it is relatively unlikely such arrangements can generate
offsetting productive efficiencies. Vertical price fixing and horizontal nonprice restraints might
be subject to marginally higher thresholds, and so on, because the likelihood that they can
generate productive efficiencies is somewhat greater. Of course, the antitrust agencies would
146

Type I errors can be seen as situations in which the court allows jurisdiction over defendants whose activities
later prove on the merits to have no interstate price effect. Type II errors can be seen as situations in which the court
denies jurisdiction to plaintiffs whose claims would prove on the merits to have a substantive interstate effect on
interstate commerce.
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face a jurisdictional constraint in assessing purely local horizontal mergers that have thus far
been formally absent.

IV.

COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, STATUTORY INTENT, AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS
“The greatest threat to consumers’ welfare is not states, and
their competition, but a uniform national regimen that stifles the power
of exit — that is, a monopoly of lawmaking.”157

This section outlines the normative case in support of the geographic market power test.
We show that it is consistent with the framework of competitive federalism and with the
statutory intent behind the Sherman Act. We also show that it would resolve ongoing confusion
in the lower federal courts and lead to more rapid evolution of substantive rules as the result of
political competition over optimal antitrust policy.
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A. Competitive Federalism

The theoretical foundation for competitive federalism derives from Charles Tiebout’s
pioneering 1956 essay A Pure theory of Local Expenditures.158 Tiebout was concerned with
analyzing the municipal supply of local public goods, such as roads, schools, and police and fire
services.159 In the face of literature concluding that the only mechanism for the provision of
public goods was the ballot box, Tiebout demonstrated that a quasi-market mechanism could also
work.160 As long as consumers of local public goods have a large number of municipalities in
which they can locate and are mobile and fully aware of the different patterns of taxation,
expenditures, and levels of services provided by each municipality, then they can“vote with their
feet” by exiting one municipality and relocating in a more hospitable one. Thus, while voting
may dictate what level of services a municipality provides, competition among municipalities
ensures that consumers will migrate to the municipality whose services match their preferences
for public good provision and taxation.

The normative implication is that to ensure all

consumers receive the services they desire at the lowest cost the size and scope of government
should be kept small to promote political competition.161
The Tiebout model has been extended to analyze the government provision of a host of
public goods,162 including law itself. Laws are a form of public good because once a court has
established a given precedent one person’s reliance on it does not diminish others’ ability to do
so. As with the provision of other public goods, the citizenry is best served if the provision of
law is subject to political, or inter-jurisdictional competition between local providers, at least to
the extent that the effects of the law are confined to the jurisdiction. While the effects of some
laws are strictly local and the effects of other laws national, Tiebout’s vision for the provision of
public goods can be achieved through a federal system in which the states and the federal
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government have credible legislative and judicial powers and healthy political competition
maintains the balance of sovereignty.
The geographic market power test applies the framework of competitive federalism to the
specific context of antitrust. The sole concern for Sherman Act jurisdiction under this test is
whether the defendants’ conduct in one state creates market power that spills across state lines in
the forms of higher prices. For those trade restraints whose price effects are confined to the
defendants’ home state, that state’s antitrust regulators have sufficient incentive and wherewithal
to adequately address the problem. Political competition between states will result in optimal,
though not necessarily uniform, antitrust policy with due regard for experimentation to address
novel business practices tailored to local conditions.
When firms restrain trade in their home state unchallenged by home-state antitrust
regulators and the price effects of market power spill across state lines, the citizens of
neighboring states bear a portion of the losses. If the restraining firms are careful to keep their
capital out of the neighboring state, there is little that state’s antitrust regulators can do to address
the problem. With citizens of the home state bearing less than the full cost of the restraint, while
— assuming the owners of the restraining firms are citizens of the home state — receiving one
hundred percent of the benefits, the state’s antitrust regulators are unlikely to pursue antitrust
policy with the same zeal as in the absence of a spillover. Only in these cases is federal antitrust
regulation warranted.
The alternative view is that antitrust regulation is subject to such dramatic scale
economies that unlimited federal authority is overwhelmingly efficient. This view could apply
either to legal administration or to the stock of legal precedents, itself. The geographic market
power test in no way hinders the realization of scale economies in lawmaking. Because law is a
public good, under the geographic market power test states can easily capture any scale
economies attributable to federal lawmaking at no cost to the federal system simply by adopting
federal rules to cover their purely internal activity if they so choose. Conversely, federal courts
are free to rely on state court decisions covering novel questions of law or fact purely internal to
the state. The geographic market power test in no way inhibits the inter-jurisdictional sharing of
legal rules. Any state that chooses to adopt novel rules is either acting foolishly, in which case it
will suffer from competition by other states, or it is acting properly in the interest of its own
citizens as local consumers of law.
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If the scale economies argument does not apply to lawmaking, it can only be based on
scale economies in legal administration. But the claim that federal regulators or courts should
have unlimited authority over the legal administration of all trade restraints amounts to a
rejection of any kind of federalism whatsoever. In an area of law whose primary concern is the
suppression of economic market power, it is anomalous to suggest that political market power
reposed exclusively in the hands of the federal government is in the long run interest of the
citizenry. A monopoly of legal administration is far more alarming than a monopoly of widget
making.163

B. Statutory Intent

According to the geographic market power test, the most important question when
deciphering the limit of Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the states are independently capable
of addressing the defendants’ exercise of market power.164 This test appears consistent with the
Founders’ intent when they included the Commerce Clause in the new Constitution and with a
substantial body of subsequent Commerce Clause case law. It is widely recognized that the
Commerce Clause was necessary to prevent states from engaging in protracted trade wars that
stifled interstate commerce and undermined national prosperity. Trade wars are one form of
interstate spillover in which the state erecting the trade barrier receives the benefits while
imposing the costs on the citizens of other states. In this setting, the dormant Commerce Clause
was sufficient to address the most salient spillovers, but this changed with industrialization,
giving rise to the affirmative Commerce Clause as a basis for federal regulation.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, state governments tried unsuccessfully to
suppress the rise of business trusts and other horizontal combinations, such as the Sugar Trust,
163

Note that the current system does not strictly give the federal government a monopoly over antitrust enforcement
because states are free to exercise their own limited antitrust policy. At the very least, however, this subjects the
citizenry to concurrent antitrust jurisdiction. Substantial differences between the application of federal and state
antitrust law to completely local activities risks imposing unnecessary legal uncertainty on the citizenry. If, for
example, a state was to permit certain horizontal pricing restraints in the face of federal per se prohibition it would
no doubt face a preemption challenge. Thus, the federal government currently has a virtual monopoly on antitrust
lawmaking except for noncommercial activity under the state action doctrine. See infra, at ?
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Note that an intermediate solution is an interstate compact subject to Congressional blessing, which would
presumably apply where the particular circumstances facing a small handful of states resulted in a spillover only as
between them, such that Congressional legislation aimed at the national economy would be redundant or
counterproductive. Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 67 MO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
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the Cotton Oil Trust, and J.D. Rockefeller’s infamous Standard Oil Trust. It was widely believed
at the time that only a federal statute could effectively combat the trusts because of their ability
to evade the reach of state regulators merely by re-incorporating in a friendly state.165 Indeed,
Congress viewed Wabash’s proscription of discrimination against interstate commerce as a
major impediment to the states’ ability unilaterally to control the trusts, whose goods invariably
moved in interstate commerce.166 This is the backdrop against which the Sherman Antitrust Act
was conceived and finally passed in 1890. The legislative history of the bill clearly indicates that
its proponents intended the Act to reach the outer limits of federal power over interstate
commerce,167 although they considered that power limited to the narrow confines of dual
federalism as most recently expressed in cases such as Wabash and Kidd.168 In the words of
Senator Sherman, the bill’s primary sponsor, “[t]he purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of
the United States to apply the same remedies against combinations . . . that have been applied in
the several states to protect local interests. If the combination is confined to a state the State
should apply the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many states, Congress
must apply the remedy.”169
Those who criticize legislative intent as a guide to judicial decision making may be
correct that it is impossible to discern the intent of any collective body, and that in any event the
legislative intent behind the Sherman Act is irrelevant given the inability of members of
Congress to foresee the dramatic changes that have taken place in the national economy and the
scope of general federal commerce power.170 Yet even conceding all this, there is a measure of
durability in Senator Sherman’s statement as a manifestation of statutory intent. Whatever
Congress may or may not have foreseen when it passed the Act, it clearly sought to resolve a
political spillover between states that prevented them from unilaterally regulating the trusts. For
the purpose of identifying the proper limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction today, it is just as
165
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relevant to inquire into the nature and scope of this spillover as it was in 1890. The most
important change that has occurred in antitrust policy since 1890 is the level of understanding
among courts and commentators about the economic effects of market power and the proper
objective of the Act. That the Court’s evolving economic understanding should lead it to revise
the limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction to better account for the discernable scope of the
underlying political spillover would seem uncontroversial.171

C. Practical Benefits

Perhaps the most obvious general benefit of the geographic market power test is that it
reduces the problem of concurrent antitrust enforcement. Subjecting all U.S. firms to federal
enforcement by both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, and to
private civil actions, is troublesome enough without adding concurrent state enforcement. As to
purely local restraints, the geographic market power test takes a first step toward limiting
concurrent enforcement. It is worth noting that increasing globalization is fast reducing the
relative size of the U.S. economy in world markets and subjecting U.S. firms to increasing
competition from foreign firms. Globalization no doubt has the effect of reducing the optimal
scope of federal antitrust enforcement.172 In response, rent seeking federal regulators inclined
toward regulatory excess are likely to direct increasing attention to local markets for “non-traded
goods” such as medical care, which, by definition, are largely insulated from the competitive
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effects of globalization.173 The geographic market power test constrains any such excess in the
face of what is a natural decline in the optimal scope of federal antitrust enforcement and where
state regulators are capable of addressing the local exercise of market power.
Note that under the current system a state can preclude federal antitrust regulators from
attacking both the internal and external activities of firms doing business within the state by
integrating into the activity in question. Under the state action doctrine established in Parker v.
Brown (1943)174 and upheld in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising (1991),175 states
are free from federal antitrust prohibitions as long as they refrain from acting in an overtly
commercial capacity. To the extent the current system allows federal regulators inefficiently to
expand their lawmaking power over otherwise private business activity that is purely internal to
the states, as a second-best solution we would expect states to integrate into those activities at the
margin to protect them from federal antitrust authority.176 The adoption of the geographic
market power test would therefore lead states to divest themselves of activities better performed
by local private firms under the state’s choice of antitrust rules.
In his Summit dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that McLean left the lower federal courts
in disarray over the issue of Sherman Act jurisdiction and that the Summit majority missed an
opportunity to clear up the resulting confusion when it found in favor of federal jurisdiction.
Since then, the lower courts have continued in disarray, with an unduly large number of suits
aimed at purely local activities, many of which are arguably frivolous on either jurisdictional or
substantive grounds. In a large number of these cases, plaintiffs succeed at the jurisdictional
stage only to fail on the merits as a result of their inability to prove a substantive restraint of
trade among the several states.
In BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Memorial Area Hosp. Ass’n (1994),177 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of a Sherman Act claim
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brought by a physician against a local hospital. Whereas the district court dismissed the case on
jurisdictional grounds, the Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment on the merits, noting the
large number of Sherman Act cases in which physicians sue hospitals in federal court for
revoking their staff privileges only to suffer dismissal on the merits.178 A similar case is Brader
v. Allegheny General Hosp. (1995),179 where the district court dismissed the physician’s
Sherman Act claim on jurisdictional grounds. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
ruling that it was sufficient for the plaintiff simply to allege, without any evidentiary burden, that
the defendant’s activities were in or substantially affected interstate commerce. On remand, the
district court granted the defendant summary judgment on the merits, and the Third Circuit
affirmed on appeal.180 The entire adjudication took an additional four years and no doubt
consumed considerable private and public resources. Under the geographic market power test,
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that terminated radiologist's contract).
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these cases would likely be dismissed at the outset on jurisdictional grounds or never filed in the
first place.
Consider Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College,181 where a
group of fraternities sued a private college that required all students to live in college housing
and participate in the college meal plan. The district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds.182 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the College’s activities
had the necessary connection to interstate commerce because many of its students were
nonresidents.183 On remand, the district court dismissed on the merits for lack of market power
in housing.184 Here, as in Brader, the final decision took four years from the initial dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds but was finally decided on the basis of facts that could well have been
used to defeat jurisdiction under the geographic market power test.185
In many Sherman Act cases following Summit, plaintiffs have declined even to raise the
issue of jurisdiction. Knowing the court will simply assume jurisdiction is satisfied,186 they
proceed to a trial on the merits. In County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp.,187 for
example, a family practice physician sued a local hospital, claiming the hospital’s policy of
granting the privilege to perform caesarian sections only to certified obstetricians or physicians
passing rigorous special training violated the Sherman Act.

The district court granted the

hospital’s motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Nowhere in the decision is the issue of jurisdiction discussed, let alone adjudicated. In Wagner
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v. Magellan Health Services, Inc.,188 a psychiatrist sued a managed care organization claiming it
had blacklisted him in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleged that the relevant
geographic market was the town of Barrington, apparently in an effort to make the defendant’s
measured market share and likely market power appear large. The defendant in this case did not
even bother to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Yet, the district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. According to the court, the plaintiff’s case failed on
the merits because the market was entirely intrastate and therefore the alleged restraint was not,
in substance, the kind prohibited by the Act.189 The lesson from these cases is that defendants
with legitimate jurisdictional claims would rather litigate on the merits outright than press their
jurisdictional claims and face the uncertainty and expense of an appeal on jurisdictional
grounds.190
These and many other cases suggests that Sherman Act defendants are being deprived of
jurisdictional protections with little corresponding benefit other than the opportunity for
plaintiffs to extract concessions by engaging in costly discovery and then proceeding to a full
trial on the merits. In the physician termination cases, it is easy to imagine that hospitals have a
legitimate stake in the conduct of their staff physicians but very difficult to imagine how a
uniform national rule on the subject promotes consumer welfare in any way. With even a remote
threat of treble damages, many defendants no doubt settle what should be considered frivolous
federal claims.

By establishing a clear and substantively reasoned basis for Sherman Act

jurisdiction, the geographic market power test would prevent waste of judicial resources and
restore defendants’ jurisdictional protections. It holds out the prospect that the proper treatment
of novel business practices can be more quickly and reliably discerned by allowing states to
innovate their own rules where the resulting effects are completely internal to the state.
A virtual scientific revolution in economics over the past 40 years has shown that
competition leads private parties to choose the form of organization that internalizes, as far as
possible, what would otherwise be economic market spillovers.191
188

By allowing political

121 F.Supp.2d 673 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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competition between states to resolve any remaining internal spillovers according to local
circumstances, the geographic market power test promises to hasten the rate at which substantive
antitrust law evolves toward the optimal treatment of novel business practices alleged to restrain
trade. The weight of federal antitrust case law and commentary makes abundantly that clear
considerable disagreement exists about the nature or effect of novel business practices. Federal
courts have often failed to correctly assess many such practices, with a decidedly negative effect
on consumer welfare during the interim. Examples include the Court’s recent reversal of the per
se rule against vertically imposed maximum prices,192 its earlier reversal of the per se rule
against vertically imposed exclusive territories,193 and the advent of the characterization question
to parse horizontal restraints that are unreasonable per se from those subject to a full
reasonableness inquiry.194 Even now federal courts are struggling with the proper application of
the Sherman Act to horizontal aggregations in so-called “network industries,” for which the
optimal tradeoff between allocative and productive efficiency is far from clear.195 This is not to
criticize our federal courts out of hand, it is simply to say that they have failed to preserve a
federal system in which competitive state lawmaking could be mobilized to provide a more rapid
information feedback mechanism as to the effect on consumer welfare of novel business
practices.
The question antitrust regulators face in reviewing horizontal arrangements under the
consumer welfare standard is whether the associated productive efficiencies, if any, are likely to
offset the allocative inefficiency from the creation of market power. Because horizontal mergers
are likely to enhance productive efficiency by integrating productive activity, their net effect
after accounting for allocative inefficiency may be to increase consumer welfare, and federal
courts therefore address them under the rule of reason.196 Horizontal arrangements that involve
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no apparent integration of productive activity are considered unlikely to generate productive
efficiency, but, following the Court’s recognition of proper characterization, this presumption
has changed.
Commentators now recognize that, even though horizontal restraints may generate
market power, they may also generate offsetting productive efficiencies. Unadulterated naked
price fixing between rival firms with large market share is unlikely to generate productive
efficiencies, but, ever since the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, business
combinations seldom come so neatly packaged.

Many horizontal business arrangements

designed to avert moral hazard, agency, or other incentive problems may appear at first glance to
have the sole effect of generating market power for the participating firms, while on closer
examination they are found to generate offsetting productive efficiencies. Syndicates formed by
investment banks to market initial public offerings of corporate stock are one example,197
vertically imposed resale price maintenance may be another,198 vertically imposed exclusive
territories between horizontally situated retailers are another,199 and copyright licensing
arrangements yet another.200
Although courts have yet to formally adopt a full reasonableness inquiry for horizontal
restraints, they have done so where nonprice restraints are vertically imposed. But even for pure
horizontal restraints, including price restraints, where the participating firms’ combined market
share is small and increasing over time, a compelling case can be made that, absent the use of
exclusionary practices, the arrangement generates productive efficiencies that outweigh any
allocative inefficiency from the creation of market power. Otherwise, the participating firms’
combined market shares would decline over time as rivals expand production and undercut
prices.201

By promoting inter-jurisdictional competition over optimal antitrust policy, the

geographic market power test foster experimentation and innovation and will more quickly
resolve any uncertainties regarding the proper treatment of novel business practices.

aggressive competitor. If these firm’s stock prices increase, on the other hand, the inference is that they will be the
fortunate beneficiaries of market power created by the merging firms.
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One need not look very far to find evidence that state competition over antitrust policy
will improve the judicial treatment of novel business practices. Recall the Mandeville case, for
example, where the defendant and its alleged co-conspirators sold their sugar into a national
market in which their market share was so small they could not possibly have influenced sugar
prices. As beet buyers, they may have enjoyed market power in northern California that allowed
them to impose a monopsony underpayment on beet growers. But together with substantial
evidence that sugar refining is subject to various incentive problems — including the difficulty
of measuring sugar beet quality and the attendant moral hazard — the plaintiff’s willingness to
enter into the challenged contract ex ante raises at least a modicum of doubt that the contract
constituted a naked restraint.202 More than likely, the agreement there was designed to avoid a
moral hazard that otherwise would have increased transaction costs. Given that the market for
sugar beets was entirely local, with no possibility that a monopsony underpayment could spill
across state lines, Mandeville stands as a poster child for the geographic market power test. By
allowing the states to “perform their role as laboratories for experimentation . . . where the best
solution is far from clear,”203 the geographic market power test ensures that the entire body of
antitrust law, both state and federal, will iterate more quickly toward the optimal set of legal
rules.

V. UNCERTAINTY, EVOLUTION, AND GENERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICTION
“The environment selects survivors”204

The Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison suggest a majority of the justices would
like to establish a clear and substantively reasoned basis for limiting federal Commerce Clause
202
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jurisdiction in a way that is consistent with competitive federalism. In part, this appears to
reflect the Court’s discomfort over its inability to bound the substantial effects test. As Justice
Thomas stated in his Lopez concurrence,“[i]n an appropriate case, I believe that we must further
reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects
the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.”205 The question is how? The Court can begin by overturning Summit and
adopting the geographic market power test as the basis for Sherman Act jurisdiction. This would
bound the substantial effects test in the antitrust context by requiring the party asserting
jurisdiction to allege a substantial interstate spillover of market power.
In what follows, we sketch a model that shows how a common law judicial system
evolves to reduce legal uncertainty in the face of positive administrative costs. We then show
that the geographic market power test represents a compelling step in the evolution of Sherman
Act jurisdiction that promises to dramatically reduce legal uncertainty.

By adopting the

geographic market power test for Sherman Act jurisdiction the Court can redirect the evolution
of general Commerce Clause jurisdiction while posing little immediate threat to the existing
stock of constitutional precedents.
Regulatory statutes inject sudden uncertainty into a common law judicial system based on
stare decisis, which is ideally suited to incremental adjustments to changing circumstances.
Absent established precedent or clear understanding of the statute’s objective, a common law
system begins a slow iterative process of case-by- case adjudication to resolve the uncertainty.206
The accumulated case law — including those cases establishing rules that were subsequently
overturned or distinguished — eventually comes to embody a stock of knowledge that allows
judges to economize on the costs of administering new cases as they arise .

This process

gradually adapts the form of legal rules to changed circumstances, filling out the interstices of
the common law and reducing legal uncertainty.
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The influence of legal uncertainty and costly administration on the expressed form of
legal rules is evident from the evolution of Sherman Act case law.207 We have already briefly
recounted the evolution of the consumer welfare standard.208 A similar evolutionary process has
been at work regarding the Court’s use of the rule of reason to address specific trade restraints.209
Early on the Court established the per se rule to preclude a costly reasonableness inquiry into
restraints such as price fixing that are so unlikely to benefit consumers they can be presumed
unreasonable as a matter of law even though there might be rare cases in which they benefit
consumers.210 The Court addresses the per se category of restraints in a perfunctory manner to
devote its scarce judicial resources to resolving disputes in the presumptively reasonable
category, for which the net effect on consumer welfare is a question of fact.211 The underlying
objective of the Sherman Act must therefore be some combination of consumer welfare and
judicial economy, rather than consumer welfare alone because unconditional pursuit of the
207
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consumer welfare standard would require the Court to engage in a full reasonableness inquiry in
all cases. Rather than being the underlying objective, consumer welfare is merely a useful proxy
for the objective that actually drives the Court’s administration of the Act.212 The important
general point is that the cost of legal administration affects the expressed form of the legal rule
— in this case the consumer welfare standard as limited by the per se rule213 — causing it to
depart from an unbiased pursuit of the statute’s underlying objective.
A fitting principled statement of the Sherman Act’s objective, and indeed the objective of
any body of common law, is to promote the commonwealth.214 The commonwealth is not simply
the sum of individual wealth of the members of society. Much of that wealth is private and
beyond the judiciary’s practical sphere of influence in the garden variety of cases.

The

commonwealth includes the sharedvalue of society’s public goods, such as the judicial system,
itself, together with its accumulated body of common law precedents.215

As a positive

proposition, the judicial system promotes the commonwealth by selecting in favor of legal rules
that increase the expected net present value of the investments private parties (including future
generations) will make in reliance on these rules after deducting the social costs of administering
them.216 These costs consist of the direct costs courts incur to conduct legal proceedings as well
as the indirect costs, both of which can be seen as a type of friction, or transaction cost broadly
conceived, that impedes the effortless functioning of the legal system.
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Indirect costs include those private parties incur gathering the information to conform
their conduct to the legal rule and, if they become litigants, to gather and present evidence
regarding their conformity to the legal rule. Perhaps most important for our purposes, indirect
costs also include the forgone opportunities the judiciary incurs administering the law in various
case categories, but also in accumulating a stock of knowledge to refine the body of legal rules to
address new circumstances and to build in the flexibility to do so at low cost. Since legal rules
merely proxy for the underlying objective of the law their application is inherently uncertain, and
the resulting adjudication will inevitably generate errors as revealed by legal commentators and
subsequent courts addressing the same or similar issues. A cruder proxy might involve greater
upfront uncertainty than the alternative, and yet the errors it generates may be more informative
as to how it can be adapted to new cases, changes in related legal rules, or outside shocks such as
social upheaval, scientific revolutions, or advancing technology. Even if a rule is ultimately
overturned or distinguished, any systematic pattern in the errors it generated may provide useful
information about the nature of the rule that should replace it. Formalistic bright-line rules such
as E. C. Knight’s distinction between manufacturing and commerce may be relatively clear and
easily administered for garden variety cases, but they can fail miserably to accomplish the law’s
underlying objective where their application is inappropriate or uncertain. Because they generate
very few nominal errors, moreover, they may end up providing little information about what rule
should refine or replace them. A capacity for information feedback, learning, and flexibility
constitute long-run investments that can allow the judiciary to gradually iterate toward a clear
and substantively reasoned body of legal rules that promote the commonwealth.217
It follows as a positive proposition that the federal judiciary administers the balance of
dual sovereignty under the Commerce Clause as if it was attempting to promote the
commonwealth. Since judicial administration is costly, however, we would expect the expressed
form of the legal rule to constitute a more or less crude proxy for the commonwealth. Compared
to the unconstrained substantial effects test, competitive federalism offers a suitably refined
proxy for the optimal balance of dual sovereignty in antitrust, where the geographic market
217
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power test now allows courts to identify the interstate effects of trade restraint with relatively
little error.
If this positive proposition is correct, then the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisdiction
should be not inconsistent with competitive federalism’s focus on interstate economic spillovers.
Indeed, Marshall’s central economic point in Gibbons was that commercial activities occurring
outside a state may spill over state lines in a way that warrants federal regulation. Perhaps
understandably, he failed to articulate any practical method of distinguishing the exact nature of
the effects giving rise to exclusive federal jurisdiction. In Cooley, the Court found that the
proper regulation of certain activities demands the discretion to meet local necessities, while the
proper regulation of other activities demands a single uniform rule.

Cooley thereby

approximated the central principle of competitive federalism, namely that some market failures
are inherently local in nature and best left to the local sovereign while others are national in
nature and best left to the federal government.
Perhaps Kidd’s formalistic reliance on the distinction between commerce and
manufacturing was a sufficient proxy for interstate economic spillovers to protect dormant
commerce powers, but the rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause with passage of the Sherman
Act appears to have changed that. Justice Holmes’s decision in Swift rejecting E. C. Knight’s
formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacturing as a basis for Sherman Act
jurisdiction — itself an unworkably crude proxy for interstate spillovers — correctly recognized
that the economic effect of trade restraints can spill across state lines even though the
defendants’ products remain within the state. Note that Holmes offered little to replace Knight’s
formalistic rule except the admonition that interstate commerce is a practical conception “drawn
from the course of business.” Shreveport provided limited guidance several years later, finding
that Congress has the power to regulate the “common instrumentalities” of interstate commerce
such as railroad cars, even if those cars remain entirely intrastate, because restraints on intrastate
rates can spill over to interstate rates.

Though “common instrumentalities” of interstate

commerce is a crude proxy for interstate economic spillovers, the facts in that case suggest there
could easily have been such a spillover. Of course, this rule is likely to err by condemning
activities involving common instrumentalities of interstate commerce that generate no interstate

jurisdiction in which the federal court must apply state antitrust law, thereby providing federal judges with a basis
for accumulating knowledge about the results of deviations from federal antitrust law.
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spillover and by failing to condemn activities that do not involve common instrumentalities but
do generate interstate spillovers. The same can be said for the Court’s occasional reliance on the
“channels” of interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction.218
Wickard gave us the aggregated substantial effects test, which, although it is generally a
very crude proxy for interstate spillovers, was applied there in an economically plausible way.219
The Court has repeatedly used an unconstrained version of this test to support federal jurisdiction
over various activities, including racial discrimination. The geographic market power test is
simply a reduced form of the unconstrained substantial effects test bounded by the requirement
that the party asserting jurisdiction must allege a specific nexus, grounded in practical antitrust
economics, between the defendant’s restraint and the interstate spillover of market power. Based
on the geographic market power test’s constrained reliance on substantial effects, we now know
that the defendants’ activities in Mandeville, Hospital Building, Goldfarb, and Summit probably
did not interstate economic spillovers of the kind the Sherman Act is meant to address. These
cases reveal systematic errors from the Court’s reliance on an excessively crude and uncertain
proxy — the substantial effects test unconstrained by sound antitrust economics — to establish
federal jurisdiction, and in hindsight the Court clearly erred by allowing the plaintiffs to establish
jurisdiction. The substantial effects test therefore has the virtue of being flexible and in no way
logically inconsistent with competitive federalism. Although it has generated a lot of litigation,
it has also generated a large body of trial and appellate case law that provides useful information
about the nature of the errors in its application and the best way to refine it as judicial
understanding evolves.
Finally, in Lopez and Morrison the Court rejected the unconstrained substantial effects
test and dispelled any suggestion that federal commerce power is limitless. These and other
recent decisions by the Court relied on what looks like competitive federalism as the proper
framework for resolving the balance of dual sovereignty. Perhaps these cases signal a new
direction for the Court’s Commerce Clause case law. Federal judges and the parties to Sherman
Act litigation now have a clear economic methodology for identifying an interstate geographic
218
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antitrust market and assessing the likelihood that the defendants’ alleged restraint, if successful,
could plausibly cause prices to increase in that market. In addressing Sherman Act jurisdiction,
the Court can now confidently reject the unconstrained substantial effects test in favor of the
relatively clear geographic market power test. Lower federal courts can then begin requiring the
party asserting jurisdiction to allege a specific substantive nexus between the defendants’
restraint and the interstate spillover of market power, giving defendants a proper chance of
prevailing on the threshold issue of jurisdiction.
Our earlier discussion showed that federal district courts have repeatedly granted antitrust
defendants summary judgment on the merits for reasons that would have warranted dismissal for
failure of subject matter jurisdiction.

In light of the geographic market power test, these

substantive decisions now appear as errors on the issue of jurisdiction. The overlap between
substance and jurisdiction derives from the Act’s language, which arguably makes restraints of
trade “among the several states” both an element of the substantive offense and the basis for
federal jurisdiction. Justice Scalia’s recent decision in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment (1998) reveals the source of information feedback from substance to jurisdiction.
In his words, “[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the
federal claim is proper only when the claim is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy’.”220 This finding establishes an admittedly narrow basis for dismissing cases for
weakness on the merits of the substantive federal claim, as where the mere existence of a trade
restraint is in substantial doubt from the face of the plaintiff’s claim.221 But the window is
presumably wide enough to support dismissal for failure of subject matter jurisdiction when the
specific weakness at issue is the plaintiff’s inability to plausibly allege that the defendants’
restraint caused prices to rise in more states than one. Because of the overlap, lower courts’
understanding of the nature of various trade restraints is likely to improve with accumulated
experience. Their understanding of the geographic scope of trade restraints is also likely to

the supply of home grown wheat for on-the-farm consumption was sufficiently elastic that it could undermine any
attempt to support national wheat prices because it would have resulted in an interstate economic spillover.
220
523 U.S. 83, 89.
221
An apt example is where the plaintiff tries to supports a Sherman Act claim for price fixing by alleging that the
defendants raised their prices simultaneously with no additional allegations that they agreed to do so.

63

improve, and any revealed errors will continue to provide a mechanism for information feedback
and learning.222
A potential criticism of the geographic market power test is that it appears to depart from
the Court’s repeated findings that the scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction is concurrent with the
scope of federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction.223 This criticism misses the mark for at least two
reasons. First, the outer limits of commerce clause jurisprudence have been shaped by situations
in which “Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce
and therefore require federal regulation.”224 As in Wickard, Congress made specific findings
identifying the parties subject to the agricultural marketing quotas and noting the substantiality
of the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat on national wheat prices. But as Scalia stated in
Summit, “[t]he jurisdictional inquiry under general prohibitions like . . . §1 of the Sherman Act,
turn[s] on the circumstances presented in each case and require[es] a particularized judicial
determination.”225 In applying the Sherman Act, courts are in no position to gather facts or make
specific findings regarding parties outside the proceeding, and horizontal aggregation under the
substantial effects test is appropriately limited in such cases.226
The second reason why the above criticism misses the mark is that the finding on which it
relies is dictum. The general limits of Commerce Clause jurisdiction cannot be defined in a
vacuum because the measure of those limits depends on the statute in question, the form of the
economic spillover it addresses, and judicial uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the
spillover. Even in the absence of uncertainty, specific activity that generates interstate economic
spillovers in one setting may not do so in another; restraints of trade are a different animal than,
say, racial discrimination, and the proper means of addressing them differ accordingly. What is
more, uncertainty over the nature and scope of economic spillovers dictates that the Court rely on
222

Identifying the proper market power threshold for various restraints may take time. For example, where the
lower federal courts might initially feel comfortable denying jurisdiction where the defendants alleged to have
engaged in horizontal division of territories have an HHI of less than 1000 in the relevant interstate geographic
antitrust market, after sufficient experience on the merits with such cases courts might raise the HHI threshold to
1600.
223
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 495 (1940)); Summit, at 329.
224
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197, n.12, (1974).
225
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197, n.12, (1974).
226
Mandeville stands as a stark example of the misuse of the aggregation principle. There, the Court hypothesized
that national sugar prices would be substantially affected if other beet refiners across the county, not parties to the
litigation, engaged in the same practice as the defendant. The hypothesis is not only ultra vires, it is very likely
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different proxies to identify the relevant spillovers in different settings. The level of uncertainty
regarding trade restraints is now low enough that reliance on the geographic market power test’s
constrained substantial effects is perfectly justified, even though the Court relies on a relatively
unconstrained version of the substantial effects test in the area of civil rights.
Although the unconstrained substantial effects test appears vague and overly expansive,
when applied to the issue of Sherman Act jurisdiction it has allowed for information feedback
and provides the flexibility to adapt to advances in judicial understanding about the nature and
geographic scope of the underlying market failure. The general point is that the judicial system
is capable of gradually overcoming the uncertainty regulatory statutes create and allowing the
Court to identify increasingly constrained versions of the substantial effects test. As with the
Sherman Act, the substantive and jurisdictional inquiries in any Commerce Clause regulation
overlap to some extent and are necessarily economic in nature. Over time, advances in economic
understanding will identify the substantive nexus, if one in fact exists,227 between the activity
addressed by any regulatory statute and an interstate economic spillover. It is the identification
of the substantive nexus that promises to bound the substantial effects test in any given setting
and allow the Court to move toward a balance of dual sovereignty consistent with the framework
of competitive federalism.
In our view, competitive federalism provides the ideal framework to guide the evolution
of Commerce Clause case law, but as with consumer welfare it is simply a useful proxy for
promoting the commonwealth. The consumer welfare standard has certainly proven to be a
powerful expression of the Sherman Act’s underlying objective; it has dramatically reduced legal
uncertainty regarding a wide range of trade restraints, to say nothing of its role in guiding the
economic methodology behind the geographic market power test. Competitive federalism is an
equally powerful expression of the objective underlying the Commerce Clause. But just as the
per se rule limits the Court’s application of the consumer welfare standard to economize on the
costs of judicial administration, some version of the substantial effects test would most likely
limit the Court’s application of competitive federalism. No proxy can be expected to perfectly
identify its target.

wrong in the context of horizontal price agreements, where the most commonly observed pattern is for outside firms
to undercut those engaged in a restraint.
227
It will ultimately be revealed if no such nexus exists, and the statute must be overturned as beyond federal
commerce power.
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In applying the Sherman Act, proxies for interstate market failures such as “channels” or
“instrumentalities” of commerce are no longer helpful in assisting the trier of fact to determine
whether an interstate spillover is more likely than not.

They are simply too crude to be

informative compared to the geographic market power test. These proxies may nevertheless be
useful expressions of the jurisdictional limits of other federal regulatory statutes, but only
because judicial uncertainty is so great that the Court must rely on them out of practical
necessity. Together with the unconstrained version of the substantial effects test, they will no
doubt generate informative errors regarding the scope of economic spillovers. At the same time,
litigation on the merits of a statute will generate informative errors regarding the exact nature of
the underlying market failure. As the case law on substance and jurisdiction evolves they should
gradually converge, allowing the Court to identify the specific substantive nexus between the
defendants’ conduct and the relevant interstate spillover.
In the context of Commerce Clause regulation, many statutes are necessarily vague about
the nature and scope of the underlying economic spillover, but it is plausible that they promote
more or less compelling objectives, as with civil rights legislation.

In the face of legal

uncertainty and costly judicial administration, the Court simply must provide some measure of
deference to federal statutes in assessing whether they fall within Congress’s commerce powers.
This conclusion follows reasonably from nature of the respective sovereign powers. In the face
of legal uncertainty, when the national government’s enumerated powers appear to conflict with
state governments’ residual powers the residual powers should yield because they provide the
states with countless alternative courses of action. Indeed, this may explain the deference the
Supremacy and Necessary and Proper Clauses seem to compel from the Court in applying
various constitutional provisions. What is more, we would expect to find that deference being
wider where legal uncertainty is greater. The unconstrained substantial effects test is merely a
reflection of this deference born of practical necessity. It would be a grave mistake for the Court
to reject the general principle that the activity a regulatory statute proscribes must bear a specific
substantive nexus to an interstate economic spillover where the Court has yet to discern the exact
contours of that nexus because it is unable to accurately measure the prohibited effects. For the
ideal case in which the Court’s economic understanding of the nature and geographic extent of
the market failure is clear, as under the Sherman Act, federal jurisdiction properly requires the
party asserting it to allege a substantive nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the interstate
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spillover to which the regulation is directed. Short of the ideal case, however, the Court must
invariably rely on more or less crude proxies for interstate spillovers in parsing the contours of
federal jurisdiction. In this setting, the plaintiff should at least have the burden of demonstrating,
on the merits, the existence of a substantive nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the
accepted proxy for interstate spillovers. Over time, the federal judiciary’s experience with the
substantive issues under various federal statutes should allow it to accumulate a stock of
knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the underlying market failures,228 to refine its
proxies over time, and to gradually iterate toward the balance of dual sovereignty consistent with
competitive federalism.
Under this approach, the charge to Congress in passing federal regulation should be to
identify what it believes to be an economic market failure common to more states than one and
to make a plausible case that the states, acting independently, face a political market failure
precluding them from correcting the problem. This would provide the Court with a substantive
basis for assessing whether the regulation falls within Congress’s constitutional authority. The
Court could then review the regulation under the rational basis or strict scrutiny standards, giving
due deference to Congress to account for legal uncertainty and its own administrative costs, and
uphold it, strike it down, or enforce it to the extent necessary to achieve legitimate Congressional
ends. Of course, Congress is unlikely to be able to identify the exact economic nature of the
market failure in any given situation, just as it was unable to do so when it passed the Sherman
Act. But competitive federalism provides a sufficiently broad framework that the Court could
nevertheless make an initial assessment that political competition between states is unlikely to
resolve the problem as Congress has identified it and then to articulate the proper limits of
Congress’s regulatory response as it gains additional experience with the subject, quite possibly
guided by concurrent advances in economic understanding. Of course the Court err, but the
important point is that it should take care to follow the general framework of competitive
federalism so that over time the errors are self-correcting and the judicial process can select in
favor of rules that promote the commonwealth.
We have already noted that some are skeptical that the framework of competitive
federalism can be used to effectively limit federal commerce powers.229 It is absolutely correct
228

As under the Sherman Act, civil causes of action for violating federal statutes no doubt hasten the process of
knowledge accumulation.
229
Lund, supra at ?.
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that those engaged in rent seeking are normally clever enough to make a plausible case that the
regulation they seek is designed to address an interstate economic spillover. This criticism
would be crippling if the common law was static, but both our model of judicial uncertainty and
the Court’s recent decisions suggest that the federal judiciary is capable of learning and evolving
to reduce legal errors over time. The response might be that this process is not fast enough, but
the question then becomes “compared to what?” Apparently, the next best alternative with
respect to a provision as vague as the Commerce Clause is to admonish judges to strictly
construe the constitution, or return to original intent, to stop legislating, or simply to do nothing,
none of which holds out much hope for progress. Political rent seeking no doubt occurs, but this
is largely a red herring in our analysis because it occurs at both the federal and state levels.
Those whose rent seeking is aimed at purely local markets, say, barbers seeking occupational
licensing,230 should have little reason to push for federal regulation. Instead, they will confine
their lobbying efforts to their local or state governments.

They will organize themselves

nationally and push for federal regulation only if state regulation would result in interstate
economic spillovers that undermine their ability to capture rents. Given that it can be quite
difficult to distinguish public interest regulation from regulation motivated by rent seeking, a
balance of dual sovereignty based on interstate economic spillovers pushes rent seeking activity
into the proper political forum. It is then reasonable to rely on the political process to limit rent
seeking and to focus on maintaining effective competition between the state and federal
governments.
The evolutionary approach we outline in this essay is by no means perfect. It will require
the Court to firmly imbed competitive federalism in its case law as a long-run evolutionary
framework for redirecting Commerce Clause jurisdiction. We believe the Court’s adoption of
the geographic market power test for Sherman Act jurisdiction would be a powerful force in this
regard.

Its inevitable success in resolving the limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction would

dramatically reduce legal uncertainty in applying competitive federalism to other regulatory
statutes. It would also spark a sustained increase in scholarly attention to the nature and scope of
market failures behind a host of federal statutes by those otherwise accustomed to thinking such
projects are fruitless because federal commerce power has no limits.

230

See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
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